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Party walls and agreements concerning them have been the basis for no small
amount of litigation in the United States with the result that decisions among the
various states are somewhat in conflict and even within the same state such deci-
sions sometimes appear to conflict with other. settled rules of law. In reviewing the
cases concerning party walls, it must always be kept in mind that frequently such
(259)
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agreements are not commercial transactions as are most other agreements concern-
ing real property, but are agreements between adjoining property owners as neigh-
bors.
A common definition for a party wall is a division wall between two tenements
which tenements belong to different persons, and such wall being for the mutual
benefit of both parties.' It is not necessary that the wall should stand part upon
each of the adjoining tenements, but it may do so, or it may stand wholly upon one. 2
In Watson v. Gray,3 four types of party walls were defined: (1) A wall of which
the two adjoining owners are tenants in common; 4 (2) a wall divided longitudinally
into two strips, one strip belonging to each of the neighboring owners;2 (3) a wall
which belongs entirely to one of the adjoining owners, but is subject to an easement
or right in the other to have it maintained as a dividing wall between the two tene-
ments and to use it to support his building;6 and (4) a wall divided longtitudinally
into two moieties, each moiety being subject to a cross easement of support in
favor of the owner of the other moiety.7 In the United States, there is generally
a presumption, in the absence of a contrary showing, that a party wall is of the
fourth type.8 That is, each party owns that part of the wall which rests upon his
land. Technically the second type is not a party wall within the definition before
stated, but is merely two walls resting one against the other, neither being favored
by support from the other. Here we are concerned primarily with the third and
fourth types.
II
Party walls may be created by written agreements between the parties, by
statute in some states, by oral agreements, or an easement may be obtained in an
existing wall by adverse user. A written agreement may be in the form of a
covenant between the parties, or it may be in the form of a grant of an easement in
an existing wall by one party to another. An owner of land may have an existing
1. Glover. v. Mersman, 4 Mo. App. 90 (1877); accord: Lederer & Strauss v.
Colonial Invest. Co., 130 Iowa 157, 106 N.W. 357 (1906); Harber v Evans, 101
Mo. 661, 14 S.W. 750 (1890); Dunscomb v. Randolph, 107 Tenn. 89, 64 S.W. 21
(1901).
2. Dorsey v. Habersack, 84 Md. 117, 35 At. 96 (1896); Glover v. Mersman,
supra note 1; Carroll Blake Constr. Co. v. Boyle, 140 Tenn. 166, 203 S.W. 945
(1918); Dunscomb v. Randolph, supra note 1.
3. 14 CIL Div. 192 (1880).
4. Wiltshire v. Sidford, 1 Man. & Ry. 404 (K. B. 1827); Cubitt v. Porter,
8 B. & C. 257 (K.B. 1828).
5. Matts v. Hawkins, 5 Taunt. 20 (C.P. 1813).
6. Tate v. Fratt, 112 Cal. 613, 44 Pac. 1061 (1896); Price v. McConnell, 27
Ill. 255 (1862); Dorsey v. Habersack, supra note 2; Dunscomb v. Randolph, supra
note 1; Glover v. Mermman, supra note 1; Harber v. Evans, supra note 1.
7. Graves v. Smith, 87 Ala. 450, 6 So. 308 (1889); Reinhardt v. Holmes,
143 Mo. App. 212, 127 S.W. 611 (1910); Sanders v. Martin, 2 Lea 213, 31 Am.
Rep. 598 (Tenn. 1879).
8. Reinhardt v. Holmes, supra note 7; Sherwood v. Cisco, 4 Sandf. (6
N.Y.S.C.) 480 (1851); Partridge v. Gilbert, 15 N. Y. 601, 69 Am. Dec. 632 (1857);
Sanders v. Martin, supra note 7.
[Vol. 15
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wall in which he gives the adjoining owner an easement as a division wall between
the two tenements and as support for a building. An agreement for a grant would
require consideration, but the construction of a building using the wall as support
in reliance upon the agreement should be sufficient to satisfy this requirement. An
agreement may, on the other hand, be entered into before the wall is constructed,
and the construction may be by both or it may be by one of the parties. It is gen-
erally held by the courts that where the agreement is that the nonbuilder may use
the wall upon payment of a part of the cost of construction, the builder. owns the
whole wall until payment or use is made, at which time the nonbuilder becomes
the owner of that part of the wall resting upon his land. 9 Under this theory, it
would appear that if the wall rests entirely upon the land of the nonbuilder, he
becomes the owner of the whole wall upon payment or use even though he pays
only one-half of the cost of construction. It would follow from this theory also,
that if the wall is constructed by both parties upon the land of one, it would belong
to the one upon whose land it rests.
A party wall may also be established by an implied grant or an implied
reservation. That is, if the owner of land upon which stands a house conveys one
part of the house and the land upon which it stands, the part of the building
conveyed and the part retained being supported by the same wall, and the de-
scription in the conveyance divides the wall in half, the transferor retains an ease-
ment of support in the half of the wall conveyed and similarly he grants an ease-
ment of support in the half retained. 0 Thus it was held in Fleming v. Cohen,1
that the grant by the owner to another of a strip of land upon which one-half of a
wall stood was a grant of one-half of the wall, and that there was an implied reser-
vation of an easement of support in the half conveyed and an implied grant of a
like- easement in the half retained. The same should apply if the owner conveyed
both lots to different people at the same time. In Henry v. Koch,- 2 it was held
that even though the description in one deed of conveyance included the whole
of the wall and five feet beyond it, the other grantee had an easement of support
in the wall since the grantees were bound by the dominant and servient uses placed
upon the lots by the common grantor. But in Cherry v. Brizzolara,13 it was held,
that if the owner of such a building conveys one part of it so as to include the
whole of the party wall, retaining the other part himself, he has no easement of
support by implied reservation in the wall. Under the generally stated rule of
easements by implied reservation and grant, this case was correctly settled. When
a common owner grants a dominant estate, he grants therewith all appurtenances
9. Glover v. Mersman, 4 Mo. App. 90 (1877); Masson and Beanson's Appeal,
70 Pa. St. 26 (1871); Hill v. City of Huron, 33 S.D. 324, 145 N.W. 570 (1914).
10. Fleming v. Cohen, 186 Mass. 323, 71 N.E. 563 (1904); Weadock v.
Champe, 193 Mich. 533, 160 N.W. 564 (1916); Partridge v. Gilbert, svPra note 8.
11. 186 Mass. 323, 71 N.E. 563 (1904); accord, Barry v. Edlavitch, 84 Md.
95, 35 Atl. 170 (1896).
12. 80 Ky. 391, 44 Am. Rep. 484 (1882); accord, Rogers v. Sinsheimer, 50
N.Y. 646 (1873).
13. 89 Ark. 309, 116 S.W. 668 (1909).
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which are continuous, apparent, and reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the
estate granted. But when he grants the servient estate, he retains only those
appurtenances which are apparent, continuous and absolutely necessary for his
ertjoyment of the estate retained.1 But it is submitted that there is no mord
absolute necessity for an easement of support for part of a wall retained as in the
Fleming case than there is for the support of a building where the whole of the wall
is conveyed, but the building supported by the wall is retained as in the Cherry
case. The courts vary as to what is absolutely necessary in the case of an implied
reservation, and this perhaps accounts for the difference between the Fleming case
and the Cherry case. In Bihss v. Sabolis,15 the court allowed an implied reservation
of an easement in six and one-half inches of land conveyed, onto which the gratitor's
house extended. Here the Illinois Supreme Court apparently considered the rule
to be the same whether dealing with an implied reservation or an implied grant,
saying: ".... the moment a severance occurs by the sale of a part, the right of the
owner to redistribute the properties of the respective portions ceases and ease-
ments or servitudes are created corresponding to the benefits and burdens mu-
tually existing at the time of the sale. This is not a rule for the benefit of
purchasers, only, but is entirely reciprocal. Hence, if instead of a benefit con-
ferred a burden hag been imposed upon the portion sold, the purchaser, pro-
vided the marks of this burden are open and visible, takes the property with a
servitude upon it. The parties are presumed to contract in reference to the condi-
tion of the property at the time of the sale, and neither has a right, by altering
arrangements then openly existing, to change materially the relative value of the
respective parts." But in Dee v. King, 6 a less liberal rule was applied in Vermont.
The court, in discussing the implied reservation of a way of necessity stated: "It
is clear that mere inconvenience, however great, will not be sufficient. It is neces-
sity, and not inconvenience, that gives the right." The court, however, posed, but
did not answer, the question of whether absolute necessity is the requirement, or
whether it would be sufficient if another way would require an expenditure unrea-
sonable in relation to the value of the land. The courts generally have accepted the
rule that the pre-existing quasi-easement must be apparent, continuous and neces-
sary as inflexible rules, failing to realize that the actual rule is the presumed inten-
tion of the parties and that the three elements stated are merely factors to be
considered in determining the intention of the parties. Therefore, other circum-
stances should be considered in determining the intention, and, even though the
elements stated exist, it would be improper to imply a grant or reservation if other
circumstances clearly show a contrary intention. Also there may be other circum-
stances which might allow such" implication without the three stated elements being
present. In the case of an implied grant of a pre-existing quasi-easement the courts
apply a similar test. They generally require that the easement be apparent, con-
tinuous and necessary to the enjoyment of the tenement conveyed. The degree of
14. Cherry v. Brizzolara, supra note 13.
15. 322 Ill. 350, 153 N.E. 684 (1926).
16. 23 Vt. 375, 50 At. 1109 (1901).
[Vol. is
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necessity required in case of the implied grant is reasonable necessity as distin-
guished from absolute necessity.'7 The reason given by the courts for the more
strict construction against the grantor in implying a reservation is the warranty
of title in the deed of the grantor.' 8 The courts seem to indicate that the covenant
against encumbrances will rebut any implication of a reservation on the part of the
grantor in the absence of absolute necessity.
Of course where the transferor severs the building at a wall and expressly pro-
vides in the instrument of conveyance for the grant or reservation of an easement
in any part of the wall conveyed or retained, there should be no question as to the
validity of such grant or reservation.' 9 Its effect would be to establish the wall as
a party wall, and the rights and duties of the owners in respect thereto would be
determined as would be done under any other express grant or reservation.
An adjoining landowner may obtain an easement of support in a wall by con-
tinued adverse user for a period of time which would bar an action against him un-
der the statute of limitations.2o Such adverse user must be open, visible, continuous
and necessary.2' However, it is generally held that the rights obtained by adverse
user cannot exceed those exercised during the period of adverse user.22 It was held
in Barry v. EdlivitCl, 23 that in the absence of a showing that the use was permissive
there is a presumption of a lost grant. Apparently Missouri would follow this
theory. In Kuidman v. Stewart,24 the Missouri Supreme Court stated: "The proof
of the express parol agreement destroys all presumption of a grant." In the Barry
case, it was also held that the user obtained an easement by adverse user to use a
strip of land between the boundary line and the wall in connection with the use of
the wall. But it was held in Bright v. Bacon and Sons,25 that there could be no ease-
ment by adverse user where there is an agreement between the parties. This rule
was followed in Missouri in the Kuhlman case. Also in Fassold v. ScluambUrg,
26
it was held by the Missouri Supreme Court that permissive use cannot ripen into
adverse possession.27 These cases should not be taken as authority for the proposi-
tion that a use which at the outset is permissive cannot turn into adverse user.
17. Carlton v. Blake, 152 Mass. 175, 25 N.E. 83 (1890); Cherry v. Brizzo-
lara, supra note 13.
18. Cherry v. Brizzolara, supra note 13.
19. Price v. McConnell, 27 Ill. 255 (1862); Robins v. Right, 331 Mo. 377, 53
S.W. 2d 1046 (1932).
20. Bright v. Bacon and Sons, 131 Ky. 848, 116 S.W. 268 (1909); Barry v.
Edlavitch, 84 Md. 95, 35 Atl. 170 (1896); Fleming v. Cohen, 186 Mass. 323, 71
N.E. 563 (1904)
21 Bright v. Bacon and Sons, supra note 20.
22. Supra note 20.
23. 84 Md. 95, 3$ At. 170 (1896).
24. 282 Mo. 108, 221 S.W. 31 (1920).
25. 131 Ky. 848, 116 S.W. 268 (1909).
26. 350 Mo. 464, 166 S.W. 2d 571 (1942).
27. Accord: Pitzman v. Boyce, 111 Mo. 387, 19 S.W. 1104 (1892); Freed v.
Greathouse, 238 Mo. App. 470, 181 S.W. 2d 41 (1944).
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An assertion of a right different than that under the license or grant is adverse.25
Also if the right is by oral license and that license is revoked, a continued use, al-
though the same as that before permitted, would be adverse.
An agreement to construct or use a party wall concerns realty, and as such
comes within the Statute of Frauds. But such an agreement has the effect of the
granting of a license and if the wall is constructed pursuant to the agreement or. a
use is made of an existing wall pursuant to such a license, the license by the ex-
penditures under it has become an interest in land and is taken out of the Statute
of Frauds by the expenditures made under the license.29 It is generally held that the
oral license becomes an irrevocable license or an easement by estoppel30 But in the
field of irrevocable licenses or easements by estoppel generally there is a diversity
of decisions by the courts of this country, and even within the same state there will
be found decisions which seemingly conflict. One group of cases holds that although'
an oral license is revocable by the licensor, if the licensee, in reasonable reliance
upon the license, expends money or makes improvements to such an extent that it
would impose a great hardship upon him to have the license revoked, equity will not
permit the revocation.-1 The other group of cases sets forth the rule that the
making of improvements under an oral license will not make the license irrevoca-
ble,32 the basis for the rule being that the parties are presumed to know that a
license, as a matter of law, is revocable. The leading case supporting the first view
28. House v. Montgomery, 19 Mo. App. 170 (1885): Held that since the con-
tract was oral and void as an easement under the Statute of Frauds, the grantee's
exercise of the rights of an easement under it were adverse to the landowner, and it
became an easement of a roadway by adverse user.
29. McBride Realty Co. v. Grace, 223 Mo. App. 588, 15 S.W. 2d 957 (1928);
Rice v. Roberts, 24 Wis. 461, 1 Am. Rep. 195 (1869).
30. Hanson v. Beaulieu, 145 Minn. 119, 176 N.W. 178 (1920); McBride
Realty Co. v. Grace, supra note 29.
31. Des Moines Terminal Co. v. Des Moines Union Ry. Co., 52 F. 2d 605(S.D. Iowa 1929); Dicky v. Yarbrough, 186 Ga. 120, 197 S.E. 234 (1938); Lein-
inger v. Goodman, 277 Pa. 75, 120 At]. 772 (1923) (Consent was implied from the
licensor's silence when he had knowledge of licensee's acts); Maupin v. Chicago
R.I. Ry., 171 Mo. 187, 71 S.W. 334 (1902); City of Chillicothe v Bryan, 103 Mo.
App. 409, 77 S.W. 465 (1903); Grandstaff v. Bland, 166 Mo. App. 41, 148 S.W. 139(1912); School District v. Lindsay, 47 Mo. App. 134 (1891); Daugherty v. Toomy,
222 S.W. 2d 197 (Tenn. 1949) on petition for cert. from 222 S.W. 2d 195 (Tenn.
App. 1949) 5 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 514 and 519 (4), Comments e and f(1944).
32. Mine La Motte Lead and Smelting Co. v. White, 106 Mo. App. 222, 80
S.W. 356 (1904); Pitzman v. Boyce, supra note 27 (License implied from silence);
Deslodge v. Pearce and Willoughby, 38 Mo. 588 (1886)-Now overruled by Mo.
REV. STAT. sec. 14784 (1939) which provides that any person who, under a parol
agreement, enters onto the land of another and sinks a shaft or opens a mine or
other prospect of minerals shall thereby obtain a lease for three years for such
purpose as against the licensor or any person claiming under him; Bland v. Bergman,
123 Conn. 61, 192 Atl. 703 (1937) (Owner of wall gave to adjoining land owner
right by oral license to use the wall for a garage. The adjoining owner built the
garage. The court held that the owner of the wall could revoke the license and get
a court decree ordering a subsequent grantee of the license to remove the garage
from the wall.).
6
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is the Pennsylvania case of Rerick v. Ker,1 3 in which case the plaintiff obtained an
oral license without consideration from the defendant to construct a dam on a stream
on the defendant's land. The plaintiff constructed the dam and a mill in reliance
upon the license granted. The court held that the license was irrevocable saying:
"A right under a license, when not specifically restricted, is commensurate with the
thing of which the license is an accessory ... having had in view an unlimited en-
joyment of the privilege, the grantee has purchased, by the expenditure of money,
a right, indefinite in point of duration, which cannot be forfeited by non-user, unless
for a period sufficient to raise the presumption of a release." This case is based
upon a consideration of the intention of the parties which some courts have failed
to make.
A distinction should be made between the granting of a mere license, which
is not the granting of an interest in land, and an attempted oral grant of an ease-
ment which fails as such because it does not meet the requirements of the Statute
of Frauds. Thus it is clear that in the Rerick case the parties contemplated the
creation of more than a mere license, revocable at the will of the licensor. The
very purpose for which the privilege was granted involved the expenditure of a
large sum of money and considerable labor. In granting the right to construct the
dam, the licensor must have realized that the licensee did not contemplate that the
license would be revoked at any time the licensor so desired. Had such been the
contemplation of the licensee he would not have attempted to obtain the license,
the expenditure under the license being such that the license would be a detriment
and not a thing of value if the licensor could revoke it at pleasure. Therefore, it
would seem to be a reasonable construction to treat the transaction as an attempted
grant of an oral easement which would be taken out of the Statute of Frauds by
the grantee's reasonable reliance upon it to an extent that it would be an undue hard-
ship upon him to allow the Statute of Frauds to be invoked against the agreement.
In Hepburn v. M'Dowell,34 the Pennsylvania court applied the doctrine as ex-
pressed in the Rerick case that the right granted by an oral agreement is commen-
surate with the thing of which the license is an accessory. In the Hepburn case, it
was held that although expenditure in reliance on the license would make the license
irrevocable for the period of time required for carrying out the purpose of the
license, it could not be extended beyond that time. Although the Missouri Supreme
Court repudiated the doctrine set forth in the Rerick case in Pitzman v. Boyce,"
in the case of AMaupin v. Chicago, R. . & P. Ry. Co.,36 it was held that the licensor
could not revoke an oral license to the railway company after the railway company
had built a switch on the land in reliance upon the license. But in the latter case
the court tended to treat the license as being supported by consideration since the
company had refused to build a road in an alley behind the licensor's lot at the
licensor's request until the licensor agreed to allow the switch to be built upon his
33. 14 S. & R. 267, 16 Am. Dec. 497 (Pa. 1826).
34. 17 S & R. 382 (Pa. 1828).
35. 111 Mo. 387, 19 S.W. 1104 (1892).
36. 171 Mo. 187, 71 S.W. 334 (1902).
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land. Probably this is a valid distinction to make between the Mawpin case and
the Rerick case-a distinction which might be of some influence, but it is not a
distinction sufficient to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds. The Statute of
Frauds deals with the form of the contract and not with the terms. It was the
company's reliance on the agreement which took it out of the Statute of Frauds.
The license involved in this case was a railroad right-of-way which was actually an
attempt to create an easement by parol and as such would come within the Statute
of Frauds. It was not an oral contract for the conveyance of land. Apparently the
court realized some distinction between an attempt to create an easement by parol
and a mere oral license, yet the tendency in the Pitznan case was to treat all oral
agreements concerning reality as mere licenses unless they contain the elements of
a contract. Consideration cannot make the distinction between a license and an
easement. Neither or both may be supported by consideration. If a landowner
attempts to grant to another an easement of a roadway, or any other easement, the
latter has a license to enter upon the land of the former to construct the roadway
or any other appurtenance necessary for the enjoyment of the easement even
though the attempted grant was by parol. The licensee does not have an easement
at the time of the attempted grant because the grant does not meet the requirements
of the Statute of Frauds. But once the licensee has made expenditures under the
license and in innocent and reasonable reliance upon the attempted grant of the
easement, which expenditures are so great that it would impose great hardship upon
him if the Statute of Frauds is invoked to prevent the grant of the easement from
being effective, he should have an easement by estoppel. In The St. Louis National
Stock Yards v. The Wiggens Ferry Co.,37 the Illinois Supreme Court distinguished
between a contract to convey land and an oral license to use land. That court held
that in the case of an oral contract to convey land, the vendee may reasonably rely
on such contract in making improvements on the land, and if he does so, the con-
tract will be taken out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds, and will be en-
forced against the vendor. But a mere licensee may not rely upon a parol license so
as to create an interest in the land and make the license irrevocable, since he has
no right to presume that the licensor agrees not to revoke the license. The validity
of this distinction is somewhat doubtful. The court did not state any reason why it
is less logical to impute to a vendee knowledge that a parol contract for the sale
of land cannot be enforced as a matter of law than it is to impute to a licensee
knowledge that a parol license is revocable as a matter of law even where the very
purpose of the license is to make permanent or semi-permanent improvements, and
is in fact an easement. Nor did the court discuss the possibility of the agreement
in the Stock Yards case being an attempted oral grant of an easement rather than
a mere license or whether or not such a distinction would have had any bearing on
the decision, although the interest granted by the license was a railroad right-of-
way, which railroad when constructed was to be for the benefit of the licensor as
well as the licensee. The St. Louis Court of Appeals held in Grandstaff v. Bland,85
37. 112 Ill. 384 (1884).
38. 166 Mo App. 41, 148 S.W. 139 (1912).
(Vol. is
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COMMENTS
that where a landowner constructed a drainage ditch across the land of an adjoin-
ing landowner under an oral license, the licensee became a "purchaser for valuable
consideration," and the license was held to be irrevocable. Compare with this case
the Kuliman case30 where the Missouri Supreme Court held that the owner of the
land across which the ditch ran and who had joined in the construction could re-
voke the license and dam up the ditch. Compare also the liberal view of the Min-
nesota court in Munclk v. Stetler,40 where the plaintiff successfully brought suit to
enjoin an adjoining landowner from damming up a drainage ditch built from the
plaintiff's land across the defendant's land and constructed by the joint expenditure
of both parties under an oral agreement. Also in Davis v. Lea,41 the Missouri Su-
preme Court applied estoppel to prevent the movement of a driveway and a part of
a house from the land of one party when the owner of the house had built it under
a mistake as to the location of the boundary. The court held that even though the
plaintiff was in no better position to know the boundary than the defendant, he
was bound to object and ask for a survey at the time he saw the house being built
if he intended in the future to attempt to bind the defendant by the boundary as
determined by the survey. The court in this case seems to find actual fraud in the
fact that the plaintiff stood by while the defendant built the house, plaintiff knowing
that the boundary line could be changed under the terms of the deed. But it must
be observed that the driveway could be moved only if it appeared that the center
of it was not the dividing line between the two lots. Plaintiff did not know that
the center of the driveway was not the dividing line. Thus where a builder did not
take the necessary precautions and determine the actual boundary, the court found
that it was fraud for the adjoining owner not to object to such lack of precaution
on the part of the builder. Probably the actual basis for the result in the Davis
case is the undue hardship which would be imposed upon the builder if he were
required to remove a brick building, and not fraud on the part of the plaintiff.
Although Missouri has never strictly followed the broad doctrine as set out in
the Pitzman case 42 that an oral license cannot become irrevocable on the basis of
estoppel, it has tended to follow a less liberal rule than that set forth in the Rerick
case,43 but where the licensee is engaged in serving some public interest, Missouri
courts tend to be more liberal in applying estoppel to give the licensee an ease-
ment.
44
As to the incidents which would attach to a party wall when estoppel is ap-
plied to the license to make it irrevocable, it should make no difference whether.
39. Note 24, supra.
40. 109 Minn. 403, 124 N.W. 14 (1910).
41. 293 Mo. 660, 239 S.W. 823 (1922).
42. Note 35, supra.
43. Note 33, supra.
44. City of Chillicothe v. Bryan, 103 Mo. App. 409, 77 S.W. 465 (1903), supra
note 31; Darlington v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 99 Mo. App. 1, 72 S.W. 122 (1902);
School District v. Lindsay, 47 Mo. App. 134 (1891).
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it is called an easement 45 or whether it is called an irrevocable license. 40 In either
instance the character of a party wall is such that the right becomes appurtenant to
the land of the licensee and would run with it under the same conditions as a sim-
ilar right expressly created by a writing.47
Some states have adopted statutes in respect to party walls under the police
power.48 Such statutes generally provide that one of two adjoining landowners may
place a wall to an extent upon the other's land, and the nonbuilder will have the
right to use the wall upon payment of half the cost of construction# 9 To take ad-
vantage of such a statute, obviously the wall must be such as can be used by both
owners as a party wall.50
III
Party wall agreements will be enforced according to the terms of the agree-
ment and the agreement will be interpreted in the light of surrounding circumstances
-intened use and common usage.51 The best court discussion of the rights and
duties of the owners of a party wall is contained in the Fleming case. 2 As a party
wall, by its very nature-it being the supporting wall for. two buildings-imports a
solid wall of sufficient strength to support two buildings of at least equal size,
ordinarily there can be no openings in it.5s Where the wall is of the type that each
of the adjoining owners own that part which rests upon his land, there are recip-
rocal cross easements for support in favor of each owner in the part owned by the
other,5 4 and this easement extends to sufficient of the adjoining soil to give the wall
support.55 On the other hand, the wall may be owned entirely by one party, the
other merely possessing an easement of support for his building in the wall,66 but
as a practical matter, the incidents are the same as where part of the wall is owned
by each party. Missouri recognizes the rule that a wall may be a party wall for
part of its height and not for the rest. 7 It was held in Abrahams v. Krautler,8
that if one adjoining owner extends a wall onto the land of the other the latter is
not liable for part of the construction cost because of his use of it in the absence of
an agreement to that effect, but if there is any damage to the wall, the owner of
45. Dicky v. Yarbrough, 186, Ga. 120, 197 S.E. 234 (1938); Pierce v. Cleve-
land, 133 Pa. St. 189, 19 Atl. 352 (1890).
46. Munch v. Stetler, 109 Minn. 403, 124 N.W. 14 (1910).
47. CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND 65 (2 ed. 1947).
48. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 263 Pa. 158, 106 Atl. 238 (1919).
49. Swift v. Calnan, 102 Iowa 206, 71 N.W. 233 (1897).
50. Robinson v. Hillman, 36 App. D.C. 576 (1911).
51. Kuh v. O'Reilly, 261 Ill. 437, 104 N.E. 5 (1913).
52. Note 11, supra.
53. Supra note 51; Graves v Smith, 87 Ala, 450, 6 So. 308 (1889); Harber v.
Evans, 101 Mo. 661, 14 S.W. 750 (1890).
54. Partridge v. Gilbert, 1. N.Y. 601, 69 Am. Dec. 632 (1857).
55. Carroll Blake Constr. Co. v. Boyle, 140 Tenn, 166, 203 S.W. 945 (1918).
56. Tate v. Fratt, 112 Cal. 613, 44 Pac. 1061 (1896); Ansin v. Taylor, 262
Mass. 159, 159 N.E. 513 (1928).
57. McBride Realty Co. v. Grace, 223 Mo App. 588, 15 S.W. 2d 957 (1928).
58. 24 Mo. 69 (1856).
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the wall must bring an action for such damage. Except where a party wall is such
by adverse user, the parties, in the absence of a contrary agreement, may increase
the height or width of the wall if such is not detrimental to the strength of the
wall," or it may be extended in length.60 In Harber v. Evan.,"1 it was held that
where a wall is built on the dividing line under an agreement that the nonbuilder
can use it upon payment of half the cost of construction, the latter could enjoin the
builder from later putting openings in the wall without any allegation or showing
that the nonbuilder ever intended to use the wall.
As to the duty to repair a party wall, either of the owners may make whatever
repairs are necessary for the proper maintenance of the wall,6 2 but in Beidler v.
King,63 it was held that where the contract imposes a duty mutually to bear the
expenses of repair, it applies only to that part of the wall which both parties use
and not to that part used by only one of the parties. In Thornto'n v. Royce,6 4 the
court held that under an agreement to pay one-half of the cost of construction upon
use of the wall, the defendant must pay that amount even though the wall had
been damaged by fire for which the 'plaintiff had collected insurance and it had been
necessary for the defendant to make repairs to the wall before he used it. The
theory applied by the court was that the obligation to pay was a contract obligation
and was not based upon the reasonable value of the wall at the time use was made
of it.
In Swentzel v. Holmes,65 the Missouri Supreme Court held that where an in-
secure party wall is maintained in such a manner that a third party is injured, the
owners of the wall are liable therefor as joint tort-feasors since the obligation to
repair is mutual. An agreement between the parties that one party is to bear all of
the expenses of repair probably would not affect such joint liability of the parties
because one should not be able to contract away his liability to third persons for
injuries caused by the improper maintenance of his property. In Clover v. Mers-
mru6 6 the court held that where the wall was constructed by one party on the
dividing line between the two parcels of land pursuant to an agreement that the
nonbuilder was to pay one-half the cost of construction when he used the wall,
until the nonbuilder paid for or made such use of the wall, the builder was the
owner and liable to the nonbuilder for damage to the latter's property caused by
improper maintenance of the wall.
An easement in a party wall exists for so long as it is usable and needed for the
59. Tate v. Fratt, 112 Cal. 613, 44 Pac. 1061 (1896); Dorsey v. Habersack, 84
Md. 117, 35 Adt. 96 (1896); Fleming v. Cohen, 186 Mass. 323, 71 N.E. 563 (1904).
60. Matthews v. Dixey, 149 Mass. 595, 22 N.E. 61 (1889).
61. 101 Mo. 661, 14 S.W. 750 (1890).
62. Fleming v Cohen, supra note 59; Carroll Blake Constr. Co. v. Boyle, 140
Tenn. 166, 203 S.W. 945 (1918).
63. 209 Ill. 302, 70 N.E. 763 (1904). Hill v. City of Huron, 33 S.D. 324, 145
N.W. 570 (1914), held that the owners are jointly liable for the repair of the wall.
64. 56 Mo. App. 179 (1894).
65. 175 S.W. 871 (Mo. 1915).
66. 4 Mo. App. 90 (1877).
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purpose for. which it was built.67 In Carroll Blake Constr. Co. v. Boyle, 8 it was
held that the easement in the wall exists as long as it is sufficient to support the
building of one of the parties. But in the Fleming case,60 it was held that although
one party cannot destroy the wall without the permission of the other, if the wall is
in a dilapidated condition and not sufficient for the use one party wishes to make of
it, he may tear it down and rebuild it after giving notice to the other party, but
the other party has an easement in the new wall to the same extent as that which
he had in the old one.
IV
There should be no doubt that the benefit of an easement in a party wall is
appurtenant to the land. The purpose of the wall is to support a building and apart
from the adjacent land it cannot fulfill that purpose.70 To convey the land is to
convey all appurtenances thereto, including the easement in the wall, even without
their mention.71 One who takes the servient estate with notice, actual or con-
structive, or knowledge of an easement takes it subject to the easement.72 It is well
settled that easements in party walls attach to and are transferred with the land.7 1
It is not unreasonable, in view of the common use of party walls, to impute notice
to a purchaser of an easement in a party wall when the wall itself is apparent even
without the instrument creating the easement being recorded. At least the wall
should give the purchaser sufficient notice to put him on inquiry as to the adjoin-
ing owner's interest in the wall whether or not the latter has made use of the wall,
and should bind the subsequent grantee to the terms of any agreement concerning
the wall. Thus in McBride Realty Co. v. Grace,74 there was an oral agreement
between the predecessors in title of the plaintiff and the defendant that the predeces-
sors of the latter would not attach a building above the first story. The wall rested
inside the defendant's lot six inches. The court held that the plaintiff's possession of
the six inch strip put the defendant on notice, not of the agreement, but of some
interest sufficient to put the defendant on inquiry.
It is generally accepted that the benefit and burden of the easement attach
not merely to the dominant and servient estates, but become appurtenant to the
land itself.75
67. Sanders v Martin, 2 Lea 213, 31 Am. Rep. 598 (Tenn. 1879).
68. 140 Tenn. 166, 203 S.W. 945 (1918).
69. Note 10, supra.
70. Barry v. Edlavitch, 84 Md. 95, 35 At. 170 (1896); Partridge v. Gilbert,
15 N.Y. 601, 69 Am. Dec. 632 (1857).
71. Jarvis v. Seele Mill Co., 173 Ill. 192, 50 N.E. 1044 (1898).
72. Lide v. Hadley, 36 Ala. 627, 76 Am. Dec. 338 (1860); Snowden v. Wilas, 19
Ind. 10, 81 Am. Dec. 370 (1862); McBride Realty Co. v. Grace, 223 Mo. App. 588,
15 S.W. 2d 957 (1928).
73. Kuh v. O'Reilly, 261 11. 437, 104 N.E. 5 (1913); Bright v. Bacon and
Sons, 131 Ky. 848, 116 S.W. 268 (1909); Weadock v. Champe, 193 Mich. 553, 160
N.W. 564 (1916); Sharp v. Cheatham, 88 Mo. 498, 57 Am. Rep. 433 (1885); Mc-
Bride Realty Co. v. Grace, supra note 72.
74 223 Mo. App. 588, 15 S.W. 2d 957 (1928).
75. COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND 65 (2 ed. 1947).
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The question of whether party wall agreements run with the land as covenants
has caused some conflict in the courts of this country. This phase of the problem
is discussed at some length by Judge Charles E. Clark in his book.76 Sharp v.
Cheatam,77 follows the rule that a purchaser with notice of the agreement is
bound thereby.78 In the McBride Realty Co. case,79 the Missouri Court of Appeals
enforced a restriction where the only notice to the purchaser was the use being made
of the wall. In Hawkes v. Hoffman,80 it was held that a grantee taking without
notice of the agreement and his successors take free of the agreement, but that it is
a covenant running with the land when it meets the requirements of such. In this
case the wall was in existence, but apparently the court did not consider the ex-
istence of the wall as being sufficient notice to the purchaser to put him on inquiry
as to an existing agreement concerning the wall. On the other hand, there are cases
which say that an agreement to pay for the use of a wall is personal as between
the original parties and does not run with the land. In Mott v. Oppenheimer,8s
the New York court seems to indicate that there is a presumption that such an
agreement is personal and will not run with the land, but if the agreement expressly
states that it is to be a covenant running with the land and binds the "heirs, and
assigns" it will run. In Gibson v. Holden,82 a distinction was made between the
benefit and the burden, the Illinois Supreme Court holding that the benefit of the
agreement to pay for the use of the wall is personal, while the burden attaches to
the land.
No attempt will here be made to discuss in full covenants which run with the
land. The purpose is merely to set forth the basic elements.8 3 The essentials needed
for a covenant concerning land to run with the land are: (1) The formalities re-
quired for the making of a covenant concerning realty, (2) the intention of the
parties that the covenant should run, (3) the covenant must "touch or concern the
land," and (4) there must be privity of estate.8 4 The formal requirement will de-
pend upon the laws of the various states as to seal, signing, and so forth of the
agreement required by the Statute of Frauds.8 5 Thus an oral executory agreement
would not run with the land. Also the agreement should be in such form that it
can be recorded under the recording statute of the state so as to give notice to the
76. Id., pp. 144-169.
77. 88 Mo. 498, 57 Am. Rep. 433 (1885).
78. Robins v. Right, 331 Mo. 377, 53 S.W. 2d 1046 (1932)-The deed of
conveyance contained the agreement and purported to bind heirs and assigns. The
court held that it was a covenant running with the land.
79. Note 74, supra.
80. 56 Wash. 120, 105 Pac. (1909).
81. 135 N.Y. 312, 31 N.E. 1097 (1892).
82. 115 Ill. 199, 3 N.E. 282 (1885).
83. For an excellent and more complete discussion of the subject, the reader
is referred to CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND 92-169
(2 ed. 1947).
84. 165 Broadway Building, Inc. v. City Investing Co., 120 F. 2d 813 (C.A.A.
2d 1941).
85. Mo. REV. STAT. sec. 3352 (1939).
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grantees,8 6 although the party wall itself, if constructed, should be sufficient to put
a purchaser on inquiry as to any agreement concerning the wall.87
In addition to the other requirements, the parties to the covenant must intend
that it should run with the land, The parties need not expressly state such inten-
tion in the agreement, but it is construed from the tenor of the whole agreement.88
In Reinhardt v. Holmes,"0 the Kansas City Court of Appeals held that a party wall
agreement will run with the land if it so provides. But in HVIing v. Chester,0 the
Kansas City Court of Appeals had held that the right to receive payment for the
use of a party wall is personal and does not run with the land. In this case the
agreement bound the heirs and assigns of the nonbuilder, but did not expressly bind
the heirs and assigns of the builder who was to receive the pay for the use of the
wall. To date this case has not been followed in Missouri.
Whether a party wall agreement touches and concerns the land has caused
some conflict of opinion among the courts. Some courts have held that agreements
to pay for a party wall do touch and concern the land,01 whereas other courts have
held that such agreements do not touch and concern the land. 2 It appears that
there should be little difficulty in holding that the agreement to pay for. the wall
touches and concerns the land since it is the payment for the use of realty in
connection with the land of the owner who is to pay for the use. This is in fact the
purchase of an easement. The difficulty seems to be in finding that the benefit, that
is the right to receive the money, touches and concerns the land. If the payment is
considered to be the payment for the use of the wall and not merely reimbursement
for the construction of the wall, it is logical to hold that the right to receive the
payment does touch and concern the land of the party who initially owns the wall.
Once built, the wall becomes realty and the property of the builder. As such it
passes to the subsequent owner of the land as part of the land, and the interest
which the nonbuilding adjoining owner has in the wall might be called an option
to purchase an easement in the wall.03 But if the payment of the money is con-
sidered to be merely reimbursement to the builder for the construction of the wall,
then the right to receive the money is personal to that builder. Treating the agree-
ment as an option to purchase an interest in realty would appear sound if the Rule
against Perpetuities is not invoked against it.es
There are at least three views as to what constitutes privity of estate. First,
86. Id., sec. 13161.
87. McBride Reality Co. v. Grace, 223 Mo. App. 588, 15 S.W. 2d 957 (1928).
88. 5 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, sec. 531 (1944).
89. 143 Mo. App. 212, 127 S.W. 611 (1910).
90. 19 Mo. App. 607 (1885).
91. Ferguson v. Warrall, 125 Ky. 618, 101 S.W. 966 (1907); Hawkes v. Hoff-
man, 56 Wash. 120, 105 Pac. 156 (1909).
92. Gibson v. Holden, 115 Ill. 119, 3 N.E. 282 (1885), supra note 82: Held
that the promise to pay does touch and concern the land, but the right to receive
payment is personal to the builder.
93. Ferguson v. Warrall, supra note 91; CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS
RUNNING WITH THE LAND 153-154 (2d ed. 1947).
94. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 93, pp. 154-155.
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and the one generally accepted as sound, is the succession to the estate in the land
of either of the parties. That is, as applicable here, continuous chain of title from
one of the original parties to the covenant down to the present owner. Second, a
transfer of an estate between the original parties to the agreement. Third is the
Massachusetts doctrine that at the time of the covenant, both of the parties to the
covenant must have had "mutual and simultaneous interests" in the land, "outside
of the covenant" itself. Judge Clark points out that only the first theory is
sound.95 The view taken by the Restatement of Property9 6 does not appear to
conform to the general view taken by the courts of this country and is fully dis-
cussed by Judge Clark.9 7 The only practical reason for the second and third rules
is an attempt to limit the number of covenants which run with the land As to
covenants already made, the rules may be effective in so limiting them. But the
rules can be avoided in future covenants merely by one party conveying to the
other then the latter reconveying, the parties at the same time executing the cove-
nant. Missouri follows the first rule.98
There is authority both ways as to whether an easement in a party wall or an
agreement to pay for the use of a party wall is a breach of covenant against en-
cumbrances in a deed of conveyance, if the easement is not excepted therefrom. 9
In Blondean v. Sheridan.00 the owners of adjoining lots entered into a written
agreement whereby the owner of one lot granted to the other an easement to
construct one-half of a wall upon the former's lot. The wall was to be four feet and
six inches thick at the base, and the nonbuilder was to have the right to use the
wall upon payment of one-half of the cost of construction. This agreement was
recorded. A subsequent grantee of the nonbuilder brought an action against the
grantor for breach of covenants of title. The Missouri Supreme Court held that
the action on the breach of covenant against encumbrances was barred by the
statute of limitations, but allowed recovery for breach of the general covenants of
warranty on the basis that the existence of the wall was in effect an eviction of the
plaintiff from that portion of the land upon which the wall stood. It has also been
held in Missouri that it is no defense in an action for breach of covenant of title
that the grantee knew of the encumbrance1 0 or that the grantor did not know of
the encumbrance.102
95. Id., pp. 146-147.
96. Sec. 534.
97. Op. cit. supra note 93, pp. 206-249.
98. Reinhardt v. Holmes, 143 Mo. App. 212, 127 S.W. 611 (1910).
99. Burr v. Lamaster, 30 Neb. 688, 46 N.W. 1015 (1890), held an easement
in a party wall to be a breach of covenant against encumbrances; Hendricks v.
Stark, 37 N.Y. 106, 93 Am. Dec. 549 (1867), held that a party wall is not such an
easement that its existence will amount to a breach of covenant against encum-
brances.
100. 81 Mo. 545 (1884).
101. Scott v. Tanner, 208 S.W. 264 (Mo. App. 1919).
102. Batavia v. Leahy, 115 S.W. 2d 78 (Mo. App. 1938).
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V
As a general rule, the courts have been rather liberal in upholding and enforc-
ing party wall agreements. No doubt one reason for this liberal view of party wall
agreements is the nature of the transaction in many instances. Many of such
agreements are entered into by landowners, not as business transactions so much as
acts of neighborliness Of course both parties generally expect to benefit from the
agreement, but because they consider the transaction more as a neighborly act
than a business transaction, they not infrequently fail to go through the necessary
formalities to make the agreement conform to all rules of law. Then when a con-
troversy arises-and such controversy is frequently between subsequent owners-
it as often as not arises from, not a matter wherein one party has been greatly
injured, but a minor dispute, and the action brought concerning the wall is fre-
quently brought more for spite than to compensate one party for injuries he has
sustained. In view of this it is neither unreasonable nor undesirable that the courts
should follow liberal rules, always with the purpose at hand to reach a decision
which will be most just ,for all parties concerned.
BRUcE A. RING
STATUS OF UNIFORM LAWS IN MISSOURI
For more than fifty years the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, aided by the American Bar Association, has worked to establish
uniformity in many phases of the law. Much has been written concerning the
desirability of this effort, yet the goal sought to be attained by the commissioners
is little more than a dream.' An attempt is made in this note to point out, in
brief fashion, the extent of Missouri's statutory coverage of the subject matter
dealt with in the Uniform and Model Acts.
Thus, in the notes following each act the status of the act in Missouri is
briefly mentioned. In those instances where Missouri has purportedly adopted the
Uniform Act, notations are made of the variations between the Uniform Act and
the Missouri adaptation. On the other hand, in dealing with the Uniform Act
not adopted by Missouri, a group which constitutes the great majority, an effort
has been made to locate Missouri statutes that deal, in whole or in part, with the
subject of the Uniform Act, whether similar or contrary to its provisions.
In order to make lawyers and judges aware that they are dealing with Uniform
Acts a section of each act drafted by the commissioners provides for the citing of
the act as a "Uniform Act." This provision is commonly called the "short title"
provision. It would seem that this provision is desirable, since uniformity of con-
struction can hardly be expected if neither the lawyers nor judges realize they are
1. Rossman, Uniformity of Laws: An Illusive Goal, 36 A. B. A. J. 175 (1950);
for helpful discussions of the difficulties involved in keeping the Uniform Laws
uniform see Hargest, Keeping the Uniform State Laws Uniform, 76 U. oF PA. L.
REv. 178 (1927); Hoar, Uniformity of Uniform Laws, 28 MARQ. L. REv. 32 (1944).
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working with a Uniform Act. Yet it should be noted that the Missouri legislature
has omitted this section in several instances.
Beginning with the Uniform Sales Act a provision was inserted in each Uniform
Act calling for uniformity of construction and interpretation in order to further
the purpose of making the law uniform in those states which enact it. Once again
the desirability of such a provision would seem obvious, but it is often omitted.
The Uniform Acts, in separate sections, provide for repeal of inconsistent acts
and for the time when the act shall take effect. Except as otherwise indicated,
Missouri omits these provisions from the body of the statute. Usually the provision
for repeal is included in the enacting clause, while the time of taking effect is cov-
ered by a separate statute having general application.2
Unless otherwise indicated, all references to section numbers in the last column
of the tabulation and in the comment following the title of the uniform act are to
Missouri Revised Statutes (1939).
Title of Uniform Act 1o 0 r:
§ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 1873 ccvdsta ee scesv er b
of lttes ofadmnisratin. he roviion ar
_________________0A_ > 0 ,= 0
ABSENCE As EVIDENCE OF DEATH
AND ABSENTEES' PROPERTY ACr 1939 3th im
§ 1873 provides that seven successive years ab-
sence creates a presumption of death. § 264 re-
peats the presumption and provides for granting
of letters of administration. The provisions are
substantially contrary to § 1 of the Uniform Act
which provides that death will not be presumed
from mere absence. §§ 264-267 provide for admin-
istration of the estate of the presumed decedent,
whereas the Uniform Act provides for administra-
tion upon a finding of death and for disposition
of the property of an absentee unheard of after a
lapse of time and after diligent search and inquiry
without a finding that he is dead. In the latter
case, the Uniform Act provides that a portion of
the estate shall be paid into an insurance fund
against which the absentee may file a claim if he
later appears.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT ACT 1939 7
§§ 3408-3416 contain provisions somewhat simi-
lar to the Uniform Act. However, the above
Missouri provisions deal only with acknowledg-
2. Mo. REv. STAT. § 659 (1939).
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ments of conveyances or written instruments af-
fecting real estate. On the other hand, the Uni-
form Act relates to any written instrument that
requires acknowledgment.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT ACT (AMENDMENT) 1942 18 *
§§ 3410 & 3411 provide that officers in the
armed forces may take acknowledgments of mem-
bers of the armed forces. These are similar to the
amendment to the Uniform Act, but the Missouri
provision requires that officers be of higher rank
than is required by the Uniform Act.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT AcT AS AMENDED 1949 0 *
The further amendments permit acknowledg-
ment to be made before attorneys at law in those
jurisdictions where attorneys are so authorized,
and provide for facsimile signatures on certificates
authenticating the official character of the officer
taking the acknowledgment. No similar Missouri
provision has been found.
AcT FIXING BASIS OF PARTICIPATION BY
SECURED CREDITORS IN INSOLVENT ESTATES 1939 5
The purpose of the Uniform Act was to adopt
one of the four conflicting rules existing in the
several jurisdictions which govern the basis upon
which a secured creditor may participate in the
general assets in a liquidation proceeding3
Missouri has no general provisions which cover
the entire subject matter of the Uniform Act. § 188
seems to provide a similar rule as does the Uni-
form Act, i.e., the so-called "bankruptcy rule," but
this section only applies to decedents' estates.
ACT TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES
FROM WITHOUT THE STATE IN CRIMINAL CASES 1931 10 *
The Uniform Act was drafted and promul-
gated to facilitate the administration of crim-
inal law. It makes provisions for securing the
attendance of a witness from without the state
in which the criminal proceeding is pending. The
Uniform Act allows the summoning of a witness
who will not be compelled to travel more than
one thousand miles to reach the place of trial.
3. For a brief discussion of these rules, see, 9 U. L. A. 21 (1942).
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The summons or subpoena shall be issued by a
judge of a court of record. The witness is exempt
from prosecution for crime or from any civil suit
in connection with any matter. which arose before
the entrance of the witness into the state in re-
sponse to the summons.4
Missouri has no similar provision.
Acr TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES FROM
WITHoUT A STATE IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 1936
(being a revision of Act to Secure Attendance
of Witnesses from Without the State in Crim-
inal Cases)
The revision of 1936 made two significant
changes and several of a minor nature. The first
major change extended the applicability of the
act to proceedings before a grand jury. Secondly
a provision was added to provide that, when ex-
pedient, a witness may be arrested, held in custody,
and delivered over to an officer of the requesting
state.
Missouri has no similar provision.
ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES ACT 1949
The Uniform Act provides that a non-resident
domiciliarf.r executor. or administrator may secure
ancillary letters and shall be preferred in the ap-
pointment of such a representative, subject to
his filing bond and appointing the clerk of court
his agent to accept service of process. Although
§ 272 of the Missouri statutes, as repealed and
amended by Mo. Laws 1943, p. 129, § 1, permits
local creditors and custodians to pay claims and
transfer certain types of personal property to the
foreign domiciliary representative under the condi-
tions set forth in the statute, §§ 10 and 254 require
that the ancillary administrator of Missouri assets
be a resident of this state.
§§ 254-260 dealing with distribution of assets are
in general similar to §§ 9-12 of the Uniform Act.
BILLS OF LADING ACT 1909
In §§ 15,603, 15,604, 15,605, which correspond
to § 48, 49, and 50 of the Uniform Act, the word
"felony" is substituted for the word "crime." Mis-
souri omits the sections calling for uniformity of
interpretation and the name of the act. Otherwise
the Missouri act is identical with the Uniform
Act It is interesting to note that § 31 of the Uni-
form Act giving full negotiability to a negotiable
bill of lading is identical with § 15,586, while the
same provision with respect to a negotiable ware-
house receipt recommended by the commissioners
0 * *
32 1917 §§ 15,556
to
15,607
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____________________ >40 Z-91 
___
on Uniform Laws in 1922 has never been adopted
in Missouri.
See Warehouse Receipts Amendments infra.
COMMON TRUST FUND Acr 1938 14
The Uniform Act provides that a bank or trust
company may establish common trust funds for
the purpose of furnishing investments to itself as a
fiduciary. The purposes of such a common invest-
ment fund are to diversify the investments of the
several trusts and thus spread the risk of loss, and
to expedite the investing of any amount of trust
funds. 5
Missouri has no similar statute. § 8026 (8) re-
quires that securities and funds held in trust are
to be kept separate by trust companies; thus, it
would seem to prohibit establishing a common trust
fund.
CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS Act 6  1939 6
§ 3658 provides for the right of contribution
as between joint tortfeasors when there is a joint
judgment. This section also authorizes a settle-
ment with less than all of the tortfeasors. § 20
of the Code of Civil Procedure, Mo. Laws 1943,
pp. 353, 362, contains provisions for third party
practice which are similar to those of § 7 of the
Uniform Law. However it does not change § 3658,
and if the injured party refuses to amend his peti-
tion there will be no joint judgment, thus no right
of contribution.7 In this respect, Missouri fails
to carry out the purpose of the Uniform Act.
CRIMINAL EXTRADITION ACT 1926 12 * *
CRIMINAL EXTRADITION ACT AS REVISED 1936 23 * *
§§ 3976-3998 deal with extradition and include
provisions similar to many sections of the Uniform
Act. The Missouri statutes, however, are not so
complete and elaborate as the Uniform Act. For
a comparison involving one particular problem,
see Comment, infra p. 302.
5. Id. at 155.
6. Fisher, Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 9 OHIO ST. L. J.
674 (1948).
7. State ex rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie, 358 Mo. 15; 213 S.W. 2d 127 (1948).
20




The Uniform Act is designed to facilitate the
compilation of statistics concerning crime, crim-
inals and criminal justice.
The act provides for the creation of a Bureau of
Criminal Statistics and makes provisions for its
administration.
The bureau is to collect all data necessary for
its compilations and reports and serve as a central
source of information to all law enforcement agen-
cies throughout the state.
Missouri has no central independent agency
which is to accomplish the purpose embodied in
the Uniform Act. Presumably, therefore, each
law enforcement agency compiles and keeps such
information as it deems advisabe.
However, § 8354 dealing with the duties of the
Superintendent of the State Highway Patrol de-
clares in part: ". . . The Superintendent shall col-
lect, compile and keep available for the use of
peace officers of the state such information as is
deemed necessary for the detection of crime and
the identification of criminals. .. ."
This provision would seem to be an attempt to
accomplish the purposes set forth by the Uniform
Act, but, of course it falls far short of the care-
fully drawn, detailed provisions of the Uniform Act.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS AcTs
The provisions of the Missouri act are substan-
tially the same as those of the Uniform Act.
§ 1126 which corresponds to § 1 of the Uniform
Act substitutes "circuit courts and courts of com-
mon pleas" for "courts of record."
§ 13 of the Uniform Act defines the word "per-
son" as used in other sections of the act. The
Missouri equivalent, § 1137, in addition to the pro-
visions of § 13 provides that "persons" shall also
be construed to include a ". .. minor represented by
next friend or guardian ad litem and any other per-
son under disability lawfully represented." Mis-
souri omits § 15 and 16 of the Uniform Act.
§ 15 is the provision for uniformity of interpre-
tation. § 16 is the short title provision.
DESERTION AND NoN-SuPPORT ACT
§ 4420 as repealed and re-enacted by Mo. Laws,
1947, pp. 279-260, provides that desertion and non-
support shall constitute a misdemeanor, and, in
this respect, is similar to § 1 of the Uniform Act.
It also provides that no more evidence of mar-
1946 0
279
1922 36 1935 §H 1126
to
1140
1910 24 * *
8. Lide, Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, 1 S. C. L. Q. 58 (1948); Note,
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, 5 TEMP. L. Q. 117 (1930).
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riage is required than in a civil action, thus cor-
responding to portions of the Uniform Act. Mis-
souri has no provision as does the Uniform Act
for court- orders requiring, in lieu of the p6nalty
provided in § 4420 for fine and imprisonment,
that the convicted person should be required to
pay a certain sum periodically for. support of the
wife or child.
DIVORCE RECOGNITION AcT9  1948 2 *
The Uniform Act was drafted in an attempt
to discourage the so-called "migratory divorce."
§ 1 of the Uniform Act provides that a divorce
obtained in another jurisdiction shall be ineffec-
tive "in this state" if both parties to the proceed-
ing at the time it was commenced were domiciled
"in this state." This provision would seem to be
merely a codification of the existing common law of
most jurisdictions.
§ 2 creates evidentiary presumptions of domicil
"within this state" if the person obtaining a for-
eign divorce ". . was domiciled in this state
within twelve months prior to the commence-
ment of the proceeding . . . and resumed resi-
dence in this state within eighteen months . . .
or at all times after his departure from this state
and until his return maintained a place of resi-
dence in this state...."
Missouri has no comparable statute.
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT 1948 3 *
The Uniform Act is designed to provide an ef-
fective procedure for the enforcement of judg-
ments in those cases where the judgment debtor
has removed himself and his property from the
state in which the judgment was rendered. The
act permits the registration of a foreign judgment
in an appropriate court "of this state." A levy
upon any property subject to execution may fol-
low immediately after registration, but the prop-
erty levied upon cannot be sold until a final judg-
ment is rendered.
9. Marsh, Uniform Divorce Recognition Act-Sections 20 and 21 of the
Divorce Act of 1949, 24 WASH. L. REV. 259 (1949).
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The Uniform Act contains provisions for serving
the judgment debtor personally and for service by
registered mail if personal service cannot be had.
In the event of personal service the proceed-
ings continue in the same manner. as any personal
action. If, ori the other hand, service is by regis-
tered mail and the judgment debtor fails to appear
and defend within the prescribed period, the regis-
tered judgment becomes final and is binding upon
the property levied upon.10
Missouri has no similar statute.
BUSINESS RECORDS AS EVIDENCE AcT11
This act was drawn to avoid the many anti-
quated and technical rules of common law regard-
ing admissability of Business Records as Evidence.
The Missouri act follows the Uniform Act ver-
batim.
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAW Act'
2
The principal purposes of this act were to abro-
gate two outmoded common law rules: (1) the
rule which forbade judicial notice of the law of
sister states of the United States and (2) the
rule that such laws were a question of fact for
the jury and not of law for the judge.' 3 The Mis-
souri provisions are identically the same as Uni-
form Act although omitting § 6 which is the in-
terpretation section.
OFFICIAL REPORTS AS EVIDENCE ACT
Missouri has no general statutory provisions
making official reports of state officers, in so far.
as relevant, admissible in evidence.
FEDERAL TAx LIEN REGISTRATION ACT
Missouri actually did not adopt the Uniform
Act as §§ 3617-21 were first enacted in 1923,
which was three years before the approval of the
Uniform Act by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws. However, the
principal provisions of the Uniform Act are iden-
tical with the Missouri provisions. The Missouri
act does not include § 4 of the Uniform Act which
provides for the state to furnish the index and file
for federal tax lien notices. Of course, there is no
short title provision or provision calling for uni-
1936 18 1949
1936 25 1949
1936 5 * *
1926 21 1923 §§3617
to
3621
tS. B. 212, Appr. 7/16/49, Mo. REV. STAT. ANN., §§ 1952.1 to .4 (Supp. 1949).
tS. B. 213, Appr. 7/16/49, Mo. REV. STAT. ANN., §§ 1814.1 to .6 (Supp. 1949).
10. 9 U. L. A. 129 (Supp. 1949).
11. Metz, An Inquiry Into the Effect of Pennsylvanids Recent Adoption of
the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, 6 U. OF Prrr. L. REV. 9 (1939).
12. Schramm, Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, 17 ORE. L. REV.
259 (1938).
13. 9 U. L. A. 297 (1942).
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-form interpretation since at the time of passage
there was no approved Uniform Act.
FIDUCIARIES AC& 14
"The Uniform Act covers situations which arise
where one person deals with another person whom
he knows to be a fiduciary. Questions relating to
actual or constructive notice of the existence of a
trust or other fiduciary obligations are not within
the scope of the act; it deals with questions re-
lating to notice of the breach of a fiduciary obli-
gation.
The liabilities of the fiduciary himself are not
dealt with, but only the liabilities of the person
dealing with the fiduciary.
The general purpose of the act is to establish
uniform and definite rules in place of the diverse
and indefinite rules now prevailing as to "construc-
tive notice" of breaches of fiduciary obligations.
. 15
The act deals generally with four classes of
persons. They are: Persons paying money or
transferring other property to fiduciaries; corpora-
tions and stock companies, both public and pri-
vate, whose securities are registered in the names
of fiduciaries; persons receiving negotiable instru-
ments, endorsed by a fiduciary, drawn by a
fiduciary, or payable to a fiduciary; and deposi-
tories of fiduciary funds.
§ 3534 provides that any person who in good
faith pays money to a trustee or a fiduciary au-
thorized to receive same shall not be responsible
for the proper application of such money. This
section is substantially the same as § 2 of the Uni-
form Act, except that § 2 includes a transfer of
other property as well as money. §§ 3535 and 3536
dealing with depositories of fiduciary funds are
somewhat similar to §§ 7-9 of the Uniform Act.
No Missouri statutes have been found which deal
with the remaining provisions of the Act.
FLAG AcT
The Uniform Act was designed to make neces-
1922 19 *
1917 15 * 9
14. Note, The Uniform Fiduciaries Act, 81 U. oF PA. L. REV. 863 (1933).
15. 9 U. L. A. 297 (1942).
[Vol. 15
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sary changes in the existing flag laws of many
states which have proved defective and given rise
to much litigation. The Uniform Act retains the
basic purposes of the existing state laws, which
was to provide punishment for the use of the flag
for commercial and advertising purposes, as well
as to punish for other treatment of the flag which
would be considered an act of desecration.' 6
§2 4805-7 contain substantially the same provi-
sions as does the Uniform Act. However, the
Uniform Act is drafted in a much more clear
and concise fashion.
FOREIGN DEPOSITIONS AcrT' 1920 11
§ 1937 substantially embodies the provisions of
the Uniform Act and also provides the methods
to be used to compel attendance of witnesses.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES Ac t ' 1918 20
The Missouri provisions concerning fraudulent
conveyances, 22 3506-3516, are modeled after the
Elizabethan Statute, which permits creditors to
set aside conveyances which are actually fraudu-
lent, and, in some instances, those made without
consideration although no actual fraud is shown.
The Uniform Act contains some similar provi-
sions, but was drafted in a manner to avoid the
confusion which has arisen from the wording and
judicial construction of the Elizabethan statutes.
Thus, the Missouri provisions substantially fail
to accomplish the purposes sought by the Uniform
Act and is even contrary to some of its provi-
sions.
INSURERS LIQUIDATION AcT 1939 11
The Uniform Act attempts to eliminate many
of the serious difficulties which arise in connec-
tion with the liquidation or reorganization of in-
surance companies. These difficulties are especially
prevalent whenever an insurance company is do-
ing business in two or. more states with both as-
sets and liabilities widely distributed geograph-
ically. The act contains detailed provisions con-
cerning proceedings as to both local and foreign
insurance companies.' 9
2§ 6052-6069 provide for liquidation and disso-
lution or reorganization of insurance companies.
Although there is, in part, some similarity between
16. Id. at 317.
17. Harley, Foreign Depositions in Ohio and the Uniform Act, 9 OHIO ST.
L. J. 679 (1948).
18. Rose and Hunsinger, Transfers in Fraud of Creditors, Ohio Law and t e
Uniform Act, 9 OHIO ST. L. J. 571 (1948); Note, Uniform Frauddent Conveyances
Act, 20 CAL. L. REv. 339 (1920).
19. 9 U. L. A. 415 (1942).
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the Missouri provisions and the Uniform Act,
the Missouri Statutes seem to be open to many
of the objections which led to the drafting of the
Uniform Act. This is especially true with regard to
claims of non-resident creditors and ancillary pro-
ceedings, neither of which are specifically covered
by the Missouri sections.
INTERSTATE ARBITRATION OF DEmA TAxEs Acr 1943
No statutory coverage in Missouri.
INTERSTATE COMPROMISE OF DEATH TAXES Acr 1943
No statutory coverage in Missouri.
The two preceding Uniform Acts were prom-
ulgated to avoid, if possible, double taxation of
intangibles in case two or. more states find the
decedent was a domiciled resident.
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT 1916
Although the Missouri statute purports to be
the Uniform Act, there are some differences. For
a helpful discussion of the Uniform Act and the
Missouri adaptation see Pittman, Missouri's "Uni-
form Limited Partnership Act," 14 Mo. LAW REv.
133 (1949).
NARcoTIc DRUG AcT20  1931
§ 4 of the Uniform Act prescribes qualifications
which must be met before a license to manufac-
ture or deal in certain named drugs shall issue
from the Board of Health, and also provides that
the State Board of Health may revoke the license
for cause. The Missouri counterpart, § 9835, is
identical in effect with these provisions, but also
adds provisions permitting an appeal from a re-
fusal of State Board of Health to issue the license
and from an order revoking a license.
§ 8 of the Uniform Act deals with preparations
which are exempt from the act and the conditions
which must be met before the exemption applies.
The corresponding Missouri provision, § 9839, is
substantially the same but permits a physician to




45 1937 H 9832
to
9854
tMo. REv. STAT. ANN., §§ 5576.1 to 5576.29 (Supp. 1949).
20. Afislinger, Reason for Uniform State Narcotic Legislation, 21 GEo. L. J.
52 (1932).
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sary. § 17, paragraph (2), of the Uniform Act
provides: "Information communicated to a physi-
cian in an effort unlawfully to procure a narcotic
drug, or unlawfully to procure the administra-
tion of any such drug, shall not be deemed a priv-
ileged communication." § 9848, paragraph (2)
adds immediately following the above quoted pro-
vision: ". . . Provided, however, that no physician
or surgeon shall be competent to testify concern-
ing any information which he may have acquired
from any patient while attending him in a pro-
fessional character and which information was nec-
essary to enable him to prescribe for such patient
as a physician, or to any act for him as a sur-
geon."
§ 20 of the Uniform Act provides that any person
convicted of violating the act shall be punished
but does not attempt to designate specifically the
punishment or to classify the violation, due to
the great difference in penal laws of each state.
The Missouri act in § 9851 makes violation a
felony and provides specific punishment.
Missouri omits § 23 of the Uniform Act calling
for uniformity of interpretation and § 25 which is
the short title provision. With the creation of the
Department of Public Welfare, there are many
sections in which "Division of Health" or "Direc-
tor" should be substituted for "State Board of
Health." These changes are pointed out in Mo.
Laws 1945, p. 945, §§ 1, 13, 22, 23.
NEGOTIABLE INSmuMENTs Acr 21
§40 of the Uniform Act reads, in the last clause
"make title through . . ." § 3055 reads, "take title
through . . ." House Bill 152, Mo. Laws 1905, p.
243, § 40 (p. 248) reads as the Uniform Act reads.
The 1939 Revised Statute is a misprint.
§ 350 reads "where suck an instrument..." 41
of the Uniform Act omits "such" and reads "where
an instrument. . . ." The presence of the word
"such might cause some confusion in trying to
make a reference back, as the word seems to re-
quire--i.e does § 3056 refer to "such" instrument
as described in §3055, which immediately precedes
it, or to negotiable instruments in general, which
the Uniform Act is supposed to regulate.
§ 3077 (2) reads ".... existence of the payee and
his capacity to endorse." §62 (2) of the Uniform
Act reads ". . . and his then capacity to endorse."
In the two preceding sections of the Missouri
statutes (3075, 3076), the admission of the maker
21. Guerrico, Unification .and Present Status of
America, 29 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1944).
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and the drawer is limited to "... the existence of
the payee and his then capacity to endorse." The
omission of the word "then" in § 3077 (2) might
conceivably broaden the scope of the acceptor's
admissions.
§ 3079 (1), the counterpart of § 64 of the Uni-
form Act, omits the word "person" following
"third." This is probably an unintentional omis-
sion. Third was obviously intended to describe
something.
§ 3093 concludes "... to all of them." § 78 of
the Uniform Act is identical with the Missouri sec-
tion with the exception of the conclusion which
reads ". . . to them all."
§ 3097 reads as if there were but two subdivi-
sions in this section. However, both § 82 of the
Uniform Act and House Bill 152, Mo. Laws 1905,
p. 243, § 82 (page 253) have three subdivisions.
The statute should read, "(2) where the drawee is
a fictitious person; (3) by waiver of presentment,
express or implied." This is obviously a typo-
graphical error in the 1939 revision.
§ 3150 reads "... in favor of every person, who
upon the face thereof ..... . §135 of the Uniform
Act uses the word "faith" rather than face and
faith appears to be the preferable word.
§ 3160 in the first clause used the word "drawer"
when the intended word would seem to be
drawee." The corresponding section of the Uni-
morm Act is §145.
§ 87 of the Uniform Act reads, "Where the
instrument is made payable at a bank it is equiva-
lent to an order to the bank to pay the same for
the account of the principal debtor thereon." Mis-
souri §3102 as amended in 1090 adds at the end of
the section: "But where the instrument is made
payable at a fixed determinable future time, the
order to the bank is limited to the day of maturity
only.
§ 3135, § 120 of the Uniform Act, adds to sub-
section (3) "except when such discharge is had in
bankruptcy proceedings."
The wording in § 3156 is identical with that
of § 141 of the Uniform Act. However, § 141 has
[Vol. is
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the numeral "(5)" preceding the last clause, be-
ginning with the words "the acceptance of some
one or more. ."
§ 3025 (3) as repealed and re-enacted in Mo.
Laws, 1945, p. 594, reads: "When it is payable to
the order of a fictitious or non-existing person or
to a living person not intended or entitled to have
any interest in it and such fact was known to the
person making so payable or. was known to his
employee or other agent who supplies or causes to
be inserted the name of such persons. . . ." The
corresponding uniform provision, § 9 (3), reads:
"When it is payable to the order of a fictitious or
nonexisting person, and such fact was known to
the person making it so payable...."
§§ 3151, 3152 as repealed and reenacted by Sen-
ate Bill 182, approved July 7, 1949, add the follow-
ing at the end of each section: . . . provided, that
this section shall not be deemed applicable to
checks on banks." §§ 136, 137 of the Uniform Act
with the exception of the above provision are the
same..
§ 3161, as repealed and reenacted by Mo. Laws
1947, p. 221, omits the last clause of § 146 of the
Uniform Act which reads: "When Saturday is not
otherwise a holiday, presentment for acceptance
may be made before 12 o'clock noon on that day."
§ 3064, corresponding to § 49 of the Uniform
Act, adds after "right" in the first sentence the
following clauses: ". . . to enforce the instrument
against one who signed for the accommodation of
his transferer, if omitted by accident or mistake."
§ 3100 as repealed and reenacted by Mo. Laws
1947, Vol. 1, p. 221, differs substantially from § 85
of the Uniform Act.
§§ 3205 to 3208 dealing with the liability of
banks and trust companies for non-payment of
tax and liability on forged and raised checks are
not included in the Uniform Act.
§ 3215 to the end of chapter 14 is not included
in the Uniform Act. These provisions deal largely
with damage on bills protested for nonacceptance
or nonpayment. They also set out corporation and
partnership liability on negotiable instruments
given by an officer, agent or employee.
§ 3049 includes both §§ 33 and 34 of the Uni-
form Act.
PARTNERSHIP AcT22  1914 30 1949
§ 40 of the Uniform Act, dealing with rules for
22. Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act, 28 HARv. L. REv. 762 (1915); Lewis,
The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YALE L. J. 617 (1915); Lichtenberger, The Uniform
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distribution after dissolution, reads in part: "In
settling accounts between the partners after dis-
solution, the following rules shall be observed, sub-
ject to any agreement to the contrary:(a) The assets of the partnership are:
I. The partnership property.
II. The contribution of the partners necessary
for the payment of all liabilities specified in
clause (b) of this paragraph.
(b) The liabilities of the partnership shall rank
in order of payment, as follows:
I. Those owing to creditors other than partners.
II. Those owing to partners other than for capi-
tal and profit.
III. Those owing to partners in respect of capital.
IV. Those owing to partners in respect of profits.
(c) The assets shall be applied in order of their
declaration in clause (a) of this paragraph to the
satisfaction of the liabilities. .... ."
The corresponding Missouri section reverses
the order of I and II of clause (a). With the
above exception the Missouri act is an exact rep-
lica of the Uniform Act.
PHOTOGRAPHIC COPIES OF BUSINESS AND PUBLIC
RECORDS As EVIDENCE ACT 1949 0
The Uniform Act was drafted in order to permit
microfilming of business and public records and
avoid the possible application of the best evidence
rle in such instances. Modem business practice
makes similar provisions extremely desirable.
Missouri has statutory provisions which sub-
stantially cover the subject matter of the Uniform
Act. Mo. Laws 1945, p.14 25. The commissioners
drafted the Uniform Law When viewing the diver-
sity of the existing laws of various states including
Missouri. The Uniform Act is drafted in a manner
which is more likely to avoid technical difficul-
ties .2 3 The Missouri act also includes a provision
for archival storage or destruction of public re-
cords and provides a procedure therefor.
23. HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMM ISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, 179, 186 (1948).
[Vol. is
30
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1950], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol15/iss3/4
1950] COMMENTS
POWERS OF FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES ACT 1944 0
The Uniform Act permits foreign representa-
tives to exercise all the powers which would exist
in favor of a local representative where there is no
administration or application therefor pending in
the state. There is no comparable Missouri pro-
vision, but see § 272 and comments following Uni-
form Ancillary Administration of Estates Act
sup ra.
§ 416 allows suit for and removal of property by
a non-resident guardian on behalf of his ward.
This provision covers in part § 3 of the Uniform
Act.
PRINCIPAL AND INCOME AcT2 4  1
The Uniform Act deals with the difficult prob-
lems of adjustment of principal and income be-
tween life tenants and remaindermen in trust and
other estates in property. "The aim followed in
the act is that of as simple and convenient admin-
istration of the estate as is consistent with fair-
ness to all beneficiaries .... The act therefore sets
forth convenient and workable rules of administra-
tion of estates which are believed to be consist-
ent with the wishes of most settlors upon the sub-
ject treated."25 The Uniform Act covers disposi-
tion of income and principal as to corporate divi-
dends and share rights, premium on discount
bonds, principal used in business, principal consist-
ing of animals or natural resources, and principal
subject to depletion. No Missouri statutory pro-
visions have been found that attempt to cover
this subject in respect to all types of estates in
property.26
PROOF OF STATUTES ACT
The Uniform Act was designed to obviate all
difficulties and clear up all inconsistencies and
differences in the existing state laws relating to
proof of statutes both local and foreign. In states
which have adopted the act, that which is proof in
one state is proof in another.27
The Missouri act omits § 2 of the Uniform Act,
which is the provision providing for uniform inter-




tS. B. 107, Appr. 8/9/49, REv. STAT. ANN., §§ 5576.51-5576.93 (Supp. 1949).
24. Nossaman, Uniform Principal and Income Act, 28 CALIF. L. REV. 34
(1939); Puhl, Uniform Principal and Income Act as Relating to Premiums and Dis-
counts on Bonds-an Aspect, 20 TEMP. L. Q. 472 (1947).
25. 9 U. L. A. 593 (1942).
26. Id. at 594.
27. Id. at 605.
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PRoPERTY ACT28  1938
The Uniform Act was drawn primarily to abol-
ish antiquated rules of the law of property which
originated during the period of early feudal law, as
well as characteristics which crept into the law from
improper application of the early law.29
Missouri has no statutory provisions which pur-
port to cover all of the aspects of the Uniform Act.
There are, however, some scattered statutes which
cover in a piecemeal fashion some of the material
dealt with in the Uniform Act.
§§ 3496 and 564 are substantially the same as
the Uniform Act, providing that no words of in-
heritance are necessary to convey a fee simple.
§ 3401 has been construed to allow conveyance
of some future and contingent interests, thus giv-
ing it, at least in part, the same effect as § 7 of the
Uniform Act.
§ 3405 provides for conveyance notwithstanding
adverse possession. § 9 of the Uniform Act con-
tains a similar provision.
§§ 3498 and 563 abolish the common law fee tail
and provide that a limitation which would have
created a fee tail at common law creates a life
estate in the named transferee and a contingent
remainder in his surviving issue. § 10 of the Uni-
form Act also abolishes the common law fee tail
but provides that the named transferee takes a
fee simple.
§ 3499 and § 11 of Uniform Act reach substan-
tially the same result in provisions relating to defi-
nite failure of issue.
§§ 3500 and 563 abolish the rule in Shelly's case,
as does §12 of the Uniform Act.
§ 16 of the Uniform Act provides for indestruc-
tibility of contingent interests. § 3502 covers this
in part.
§§§ 3390 and 3385 have been construed to pro-
vide that a married woman may convey her
28. Foster, Some Observations on the Uniform Property Act, 20 NEn. L. REv.
333 (1941); Note, The Uniform Property Act, 52 HARv. L. REv. 993 (1939).
29. 9 U. L. A. 611 (1942).
[Vol. is
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property as if she were a femme sole, as does § 19
of the Uniform Act.
§ 3003 providing for treble damages in case of
waste as well as forfeiture of the place wasted, is
substantially contrary to § 21 of the Uniform Act.
RECIPROCAL TRANSFER TAx ACT 1928 17 1929 t
The Uniform Act provides that there shall be
no tax transfer of intangible personal property "....
if the transferor is a resident of a state or territory
of the United States which at the time of the
transfer did not impose a transfer tax or death tax
of any character in respect of [intangible] personal
property of residents of this state . . ." or if the
laws of the state or territory of residence of the
transferor at the time of transfer contained a re-
ciprocal provision under which non-residents were
exempted from such taxes.
RELATING TO REVERTER OF REALTY ACT 1944 0
The Uniform Act was drawn to place a time
limitation upon the effectiveness of possibilities
of reverter and similar interests. The act pro-
vides that "Every condition [restrictive cove-
nant] limitation or possibility of reverter affecting
the title or use of real property shall be limited to
a term not exceeding [thirty]30 years after the
effective date of the instrument creating it not-
withstanding any provision in that instrument
... " The limitation does not apply to existing
interests in a gift or devise for charitable purposes,
nor to any ". . . lease present or future, or any
easement, right of way, mortgage, trust, transmis-
sion or transportation line, right to take minerals,
or charge or support during the life of a person
or persons ... "
There is no similar statutory provision in Mis-
souri.
SALES ACT 1906 36
Missouri statutes do not generally cover the
subject matter dealt with in the Uniform Act.
SIMULTANEOUS DEATII ACT31 1940 38 1947
With the advent of modern forms of transpor-
tation, the frequency of instances of simultaneous
death was greatly increased. Thus the courts have
become faced with the problem of administering
estates of persons who have died under circum-
stances where there is no evidence of survivorship.
The Uniform Act was drafted in an attempt to
IS. B. 214, Appr. 7/16/49, Mo. REv. STAT. ANN., § 1817 (Supp. 1949).
tRepealed, Mo. Laws 1939, p. 182, § 1.
30. Brackets included in the act.
31. Perry, Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, 1 S. C. L. Q. 64 (1948); Com-
ment, The U-niform Simdtaneos Death Act, 13 Mo. L. REv. 230 (1948).
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alleviate the unhappy result in many jurisdictions
where either by jurisprudence or legislation con-
clusive and unrealistic presumptions of survivor-
ship were employed by the courts. Similarly the
common law rule that survivorship must be prov-
ed was thought to be in many cases asking the im-
possible.
Missouri omits § 10 of the Uniform Act which
declares each provision to be severable so that the
finding of one provision to be invalid will not re-
sult in the entire act being declared invalid. There
is no substantial difference between the Missouri
act and Uniform Act.
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONs ACr
§§ 1002-1041 deal with the same subject matter.
as does the Uniform Act. Generally speaking, the
time prescribed within which various causes of ac-
tion may be brought in Missouri is longer than
that provided for in the Uniform Act.
STOCK TRANSFER ACT
3 2
The Uniform Act deals generally with the trans-
fer and negotiability of stock certificates.
§ 1 of Missouri act adds a provision allowing
for transfer by an assignment endorsed on the
stock certificate or in a separate instrument sign-
ed by the trustee in bankruptcy, receiver, guard-
ian, executor, administrator, or other person au-
thorized by law to transfer the certificate to be
the owner of the shares represented thereby.
§ 13 of the Missouri Act dealing with attach-
ment and levy upon shares differs materially from
the corresponding Uniform section since the reme-
dies allowed in §§ 1345 and 1346 are incorporated
in the Missouri section.
§ 23 of the Uniform Act provides that its provi-
sions apply only to certificates issued after the
1939 0
1909 51 1943
tMo. Laws 1947, Vol. 1, p. 13, Mo. REv. STAT. ANN., § 317.1-.8 (Supp. 1949).
32. Hine, Situs of Shares Issued Under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 87
U. OF PA. L. REv. 700 (1939); Imlay, Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 11 J. B. A. DIsT.
COLUM. 339 (1944); Modesitt, Application of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act to
Gifts of Stock, 20 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 67 (1947); Note, The Uniform Stock Transfer
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taking effect of the act. The Missouri counterpart
reads: "The provisions of the transfer act shall
apply to certificates for shares whether issued be-
fore or after the taking effect of the transfer act,
and also so far as applicable, to voting trust cer-
tificates and stock purchase or subscription war-
rants which shall be transferable in the same
manner and with the same effect as certificates for
shares, but said act shall not apply to certificates
or shares of mutual savings and loan associations."
TRANSFER OF DEPENDENTS Acr 1939 9 * *
Tht Uniform Act was promulgated in an at-
tempt to solve some of the difficulties arising due
to indigent persons drifting from state to state
seeking financial aid. It provides for reciprocal
agreements between the appropriate agencies of
two states subject to the approval of the Attorney-
general, regarding interstate transportation of poor
and indigent persons and also agreements for.
transfer, acceptance and support of such persons.33
Missouri has no statutory provision similar to
the Uniform Act.
TRuST RECEIPTS AcT34  1933 26 *
The Uniform Act was drafted to clarify the con-
flict and uncertainty which had developed in the
law with the advent of the "trust receipt" as a se-
curity device. The "trust receipt" was first gen-
erally employed to finance imports, but later has
been rather extensively used in financing domestic
transactions as well, being particularly used in the
auto industry.
The validity of these transactions which re-
semble both a chattel mortgage and a conditional
sale have been somewhat uncertain in many juris-
dictions.
The Uniform Act sets out detailed provisions
governing these transactions. It regulates not
only the "orthodox" importing trust receipt trans-
action but also the analogous domestic transac-
tion. The act attempts to afford adequate pro-
tection for trust receipt financers, trust receipt
borrowers, purchasers, and general creditors35
There are no similar statutory provisions in Mis-
souri.
TRuSTEEs' ACCOUNTING Acr 1936 4 * *
TRUSTEES' AccOUNTING ACT AS AMENDED 1937 4 * *
The Uniform Act provides for periodic account-
33. 9 U. L. A. 662 (1942).
34. Heindl, Trmst Receipt Financing Under the Uniform Trusts Receipts Act,
26 CHi-KENT REv. 197 (1948).
35. 9 U. L. A. 665 (1942).
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ing by trustees and specifies the procedure therefor
and the details to be contained in such accounting.
Provisions are made for both testementary and
inter vivos trusts.
The inadequacy of the Missouri provisions
touching the subject matter of the Uniform Act is
tellingly pointed out in Overstreet, Appointment
of Successor Trustees, Trust Administration and
Settlements in Missouri, 13 Mo. L. REv. 255
(1948).
TausMs AcT36  1937
The principal purposes of the Uniform Act as
stated by the commissioners are: "(1) To do
away with a few obsolete and unjust rules of
trust law which have come about through unfor-
tunate judicial decisions or are survivals of an-
cient property law;
(2) To clarify and tighten the rules regarding
loyalty by a trustee to the interests of his benefi-
ciary;
(3) To relax a few equity rules regarding trust
administration, under careful restriction in order
to ficilitate convenience in the administration of
trusts."
37
The act abolishes common law distinctions be-
tween different types of bank accounts for the
payment of debts, abolishes the rule of "first in,
first out," substituting a provision that the trus-
tee be deemed to have stolen from the several
trusts in equal proportion; provides in case of an
oral trust of realty that the grantee-trustee holds
on constructive trust for the settlor; provides that
a trustee may be sued for breach of contract in his
legal capacity as trustee with appropriate provisions
for intervention by the beneficiaries; and also im-
poses tort liability on the trust estate in instances
where, if imposed on the trustee as an individual,
he could get reimbursement from the trust estate.
The other. provisions of the act are too detailed
to be included in this discussion.
6
36. Nylund, Uniform Acts Relating to Trusts, 16 CHi-KENT REv. 81 (1938);
Vanneman, Rowley, The Uniform Trusts Act, 13 U. OF GIN. L. REv. 157 (1939).
37. 9 U. L. A. 593 (1942).
[Vol. is
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Missouri has no statutory provisions which at-
tempt to cover the scope of the Uniform Act.
UNAUTHORIZED INSURERS ACT 1938 5
The Uniform Act was drawn to provide protec-
tion against insurance companies which are engag-
ed in the insurance business without proper au-
thorization from the state.
§ 6101 is similar to § 1 of the Uniform Act.
Both prohibit persons from acting as agents for
unauthorized insurers. The Missouri section also
provides a penalty for violation as does § 8 of the
Uniform Act.
§§ 6005-6008 contain provisions similar to § 5
of the Uniform Act dealing with service of pro-
cess on unauthorized insurers.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER RISK ACT 1935 6
The object of this act is to protect the pur-
chaser of real estate where there is a contract of
sale and the property is destroyed before the pur-
chaser has gone into possession or has taken legal
title, and to protect the vendor after transfer of
possession. 38 Missouri has no comparable provi-
sions.
VETERANS' GUARDIANSHIP AcT39  1927 17
"The proposed Uniform Veterans Guardianship
Act provides for the appointment of guardians for
incompetent and minor beneficiaries entitled to re-
ceive benefits from the government, prescribes limi-
tations regarding fees, commissions, bonds, and
number of cases in which a fiduciary may act, and
supplies procedure for discharge of guardian upon
ward being restored to sanity or coming of age. It
further provides for commitment of mentally af-
flicted veterans to Bureau hospitals. The act aff-
fords complete co-operation between state courts
and the Bureau caring for such beneficiaries and
their estates." 40
VETERANS' GUARDIANSHIP ACT (As REVISED) 1942 23 1947 t
The revised act attempts to clarify and supple-
ment the original act. § 4 of the Uniform Act de-
clares that no person other than a bank or trust
company shall be guardian of more than five wards
unless they are in the same family. The Missouri
adaptation prevents banks and trust companies
tMo. Laws 1943, p. 495, Mo. REv. STAT. ANN., § 5563.1-5563.24 (Supp. 1949).
38. Id. at 731.
39. Davis, Application of Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act, 7 ALA. LAWYER
304 (1946); Imlay, Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act, 12 J. B. A. DIST. COLUM.
378 (1945).
40. 9 U. L. A. 737 (1942).
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as well as individuals from being guardians for
more than five wards.
§ 1$5 of the Uniform Act provides that the court
may authorize the purchase of real estate for a home
for the ward or ". . . as a home for his dependent
family." The Missouri act omits the above quoted
clause and substitutes ". . . as a home for his wife
and minor children, or a parent if wholly depend-
ent upon him for his or her. support."
The Missouri act omits § 16 of the Uniform Act
which provides that the custodian of any public
record shall furnish the Veterans Administration
with a copy if such is needed to determine the vet-
eran's eligibility for any benefits. The Missouri act
repeals §§ 605, 606 which were the only provisions
of the original act adopted.
VITAL STATIsTIcs AcT 1942 10 1947
The Uniform Act was drawn to supply the ob-
vious need for. a uniform and comprehensive sys-
tem of vital statistics throughout the entire
United States.
§ 1 of the Missouri Act [Mo. REv. STAT. ANN,
§ 9783.1 (Supp. 1949)] which is the definition
section corresponding to § 1 of the Uniform Act,
adds to the definition of "live with," but it does
not seem to change the meaning. The Missouri
section defines "Division" to mean the Division
of Health of the State Department of Public
Health and Welfare and "Director" to mean the
director of that "division."
Throughout the act Missouri substitutes either
"the Division" or "Director" for " State Board of
Health."
§ 15 of the Missouri act substitutes "National
Office of Vital Statistics" for "United States Bu-
reau of Census."
§ 18 of the Missouri act makes more elabor-
ate provisions for the furnishing of certified copies
of birth and death records than do the cor-
responding sections in the Uniform Act.
The remainder of the provisions are substan-
tially the same as those in the Uniform Act.
-Mo. Laws 1947, p. 4, Mo. REV. STAT. ANN., §§ 607.1-.22 (Supp. 1949).
(Vol. is
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Missouri omits § 38, making each provision of
the act severable, and § 39, which calls for uni-
formity of interpretation.
WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS AcT 1906
Missouri omits § 11 of the Uniform Act dealing
with cancellation of a negotiable receipt upon de-
livery of the goods.
Missouri also omits § 57 calling for uniformity
of interpretation, § 49, which makes the provisions
of the act inapplicable to recipts made and deliv-
ered prior to the taking effect of the act, and § 61,
which is the short title provision.
WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS AcT AMENDMENTS 1922
Missouri has adopted none of the amendments.
It might again be noted that the amendment to
§ 40 made it possible for a thief or a finder to ne-
gotiate a receipt, thus conforming to the similar
provision, § 31, in the Uniform Bills of Lading
Act. Thus, today in Missouri, some 28 years after
the commissioners attempted to give full negotia-
bility to a negotiable warehouse receipt, as well
as a negotiable bill of lading, a thief or finder
may negotiate a negotiable bill of lading, but not





"Where there is a demand for an act covering the subject matter in a substan-
tial number of states, but where in the judgment of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws it is not a subject upon which uniformity
between the states is necessary or desirable, but where it would be helpful to have
legislation which would tend toward uniformity where enacted, acts on such sub-
jects are promulgated as Model Acts."41
ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF
COMMISSIONERS
The Model Act creates a commission on Uniform
State Laws consisting of 3 members appointed by
the Governor for 4 year terms. The commission
also includes any resident who has been elected a
life member of the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws. Other pro-
visions of the Model Act deal with functions of
the commission, duties of commissioners, and
method of filling vacancies.
§ 5 of the Model Act provides for appropria-
tion of funds to pay the necessary expenses of
commissioners and also for funds to contribute
1944 0 * *
,Mo. REV. STAT. ANN., §§ 9783.1-.38 (Supp. 1949).
41. Id. at 71.
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to the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws.
Missouri does not cover the subject matter of
the Uniform Act, except that one of the clauses
of § 12896.8, Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1949),
authorizes payment of necessary expenses of com-
missioners ". . . heretofore or hereinafter desig-
nated by the Governor as Missouri's representa-
tives to the national conference of Commissioners
on State Uniform Laws ... "
Mo. Laws, 1941, p. 405 § 1, Mo. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 12896.4 (Supp. 1949), establishes a Com-
mission on Interstate Cooperation. One of its
-functions is to encourage and support participation
in the work of the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws. The commis-
sion thus allocates, from its annual appropriation,
a certain sum to pay expenses of Missouri Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, and also allo-
cates an amount to be contributed to the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws.
BusINESs CORPORATION AcT 1928
The General and Business Corporation Act of
Missouri, Mo. Laws, 1943, p. 410, covers the
general subject matter contained in the Model
Business Corporation Act. However, the Missouri
Act does not purport to follow the Model Act.
CoMposITE REPORTS AS EVIDENCE AcT 1936
The Model Act provides that written reports
compiled by unbiased experts are, insofar as rele-
vant, admissible as evidence, although the con-
clusions are -based wholly or partly upon written
information furnished by the cooperation of sev-
eral persons acting -for a common purpose. The
court may exclude such reports if it feels sub-
stantial injustice will result. The act also pro-
vides that the persons who furnished informa-
tion on which such report was based may be
called for purposes of cross-examination. Notice
of intention to offer such report, accompanied by
a copy of it, must be given to the adverse party
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COURT ADMINISTRATOR ACT
The Model Act provides for the establishment
of a state office to be known as "Administrator
for the Courts." The administrator and his as-
sistants shall aid in directing the business affairs
of the courts but shall have no power of super-
vision over the judicial function. Their principal
duties are to gather data concerning the work of
the court and make recommendations for better
judicial administration to the court of last resort.
Missouri has no similar statutory provision.
MODEL ACT CONCERNING THE ADMINISTRATION
1948 0
Or CHARITABLE TRUST DEVISES AND BEQUESTS 1944 3
The Model Act is a statutory recognition of
the cy pres doctrine. Missouri has no comparable
statute.
EXECUTION OF WILLS ACT 1940
§ 2 of the Model Act reads: "Any person of
sound mind eighteen years of age or older may
make any will."
Missouri § 518-519 make the age 21 except
that any male person over 18 may bequeath per-
sonalty.
§ 520 dealing with executions is similar to § 4
of Model Act although there are slight varia-
tions. The Model Act requires that the attest-
ing witnesses sign in the presence of each other
as well as in the presence of the testator, while
only the latter is required by § 520.
§§ 542-545 providing for nuncupative wills and
their limitations are, with some variation, sub-
stantially similar to § 6 of the Model Act. The
Model Act limits the amount to be bequeathed
to $1000 except in the case of members of the
armed forces in time of war. In the latter case
the limit is $10,000. § 542 sets the Missouri limit -
at $200. However, § 543 provides that any mar-
iner at sea or soldier in the military service may
dispose of his wages and other personalty as he
might if the bequest were reduced to writing.
Thus, there would seem to be no monetary limit.
§§ 5.$5-562 should be compared with §3 of the
Model Act as to who may witness a will.
Missouri has no statutory provision providing for
a holographic will as does the Model Act.
EXPERT TESTIMONY ACT 1937
The Model Act provides for the appointment
of expert witnesses by the court when advisable
and sets out the procedure therefor. Missouri has
no statutory provisions similar to the Model Act.
INTERPARTY AGREEMENT ACT
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follows: "A conveyance, release or sale may be
made to or by two or more persons acting jointly
and one or more, but less than all, of these per-
sons acting either by himself or themselves or with
other persons; and a contract may be made be-
tween such parties."
Thus the act would seem to permit a convey-
ance, release or sale from A, an individual, to
an unincorporated association of persons, of which
A is a member. The converse of the above prop-
osition would also be permitted as would a con-
tract between the above mentioned parties.
The Model Act also provides that "no contract
shall be discharged.., the obligation and the right
thereunder shall become vested in the same person,
acting in different capacities as to the right and
the obligation."
Another provision declares that nothing in the
act shall be construed to validate any transaction
which is fraudulant.
JOINT OBLIGATION ACT 1925 5
The Model Act was drafted to prevent injustice
likely to arise from the application of the tech-
nical common law rules in regard to joint obli-
gations. The act changes common law rules as to
both joint obligors and joint obligees.
Missouri does not cover the entire subject mat-
ter dealt with in the Uniform Act. § 3341 provid-
ing for survival of obligor against heirs, execu-
tor or administrator of a deceased joint obligor
is similar to § 6 of the Model Act.
The Model Act, as drafted, covers liability in
tort and, thus, overlaps some provisions of the
Uniform Contribution among Tortfeasors Act.
The commissioners therefore recommended that
any state having the later Uniform Act should
amend the Joint Obligations Act to exclude tort
liability.
POWER OF SALE MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE ACT 1940 0
§§ 3447-3464 deal partially with the subject
matter of the Model Act. There is not a great
deal of similarity between the Missouri provisions
and the Model Act. §3450 declares that there
[Vol. is
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may be a redemption by the mortgagor, within a
year after sale, only in those instances where the
holder of the obligation or his agent purchases
the land, and provided notice has been given by
the mortgagee of his intention to redeem. The
Model Act allows a period for redemption after.
sale in all situations.
The Model Act precludes the mortgagee from
getting a deficiency judgment when taking advan-
tage of the provisions of the act. Missouri has no
counterpart. The notice provisions of the Model
Act also vary substantially from those in Missouri4 2
RESALE PRICE CONTROL ACT 1940 0
Missouri is one of the few states that has not
enacted some type of so-called "fair. trade" law.
It will be noted that the commissioners point out
in their prefatory note to this Act that they do
not urge it upon the states in view of continuing
controversy concerning resale price control.
Thus, the measure has been designated as a
Model rather than a Uniform Act, and ". . . made
available as . . . a clear, consistent and workable
measure for those states that wish to continue
or to adopt the policy embodied in it."4 3
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES ACT 1944 1
The Model Act is merely a codification of the
American common law Rule against Perpetuities.
Missouri has no such statute.
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 1946 0
The Missouri legislature in 1946 passed an act
"Providing for review of the decisions rules, and
regulations of administrative officers or bodies
existing under the constitution or by law."
The Act, Mo. Laws, 1945, pp. 1504-1509, is
patterned after the Model Act, although the Mis-
souri act was passed before the Model Act was
officially promulgated. There are some variations,
but the Missouri Act seems to have substantially
accomplished the ends sought by the Model Act.
It might be pointed out that the Missouri Act
gives the court somewhat wider powers to stay
administrative proceedings than does the Model
Act. Also it should be mentioned that powers con-
ferred upon the courts with respect to hearing
evidence and finding facts are broader under the
Missouri statute than under the Model Act.
42. See generally, Comment, Real Estate Mortgage Theory in Missouri, 6 Mo.
L. REv. 200 (1941).
43. HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, 247 (1940).
1950] COMMENTS
43
et al.: Masthead and Comments
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1950
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
.0oo* o
Model Act 00= 0' > ) '
WAR SERVICE VALIDATION ACT" 1944 1 *
Missouri has no statutory coverage of the
general subject matter, i.e., validation of instru-
ments made by members of the armed forces dur-
ing the war but defectively acknowledged, at-
tested, or witnessed. The Uniform Act also pro-
vides that no such instrument shall be denied
recordation. In this connection § 1845 might be
noted. It provides that defective instruments
which are recorded shall constitute constructive
notice. However this only applies to instruments
recorded prior to the time of the passage of the
statute. See also Uniform Acknowledgment Act
(amendment) srupra.
WRrTrEN OBLIGATIONS ACT 1925 2 * *
The Model Written Obligations Act was prom-
ulgated to provide a method by which a release
or a promise would become binding though grat-
uitous. This was thought necessary since many
states have abolished the efficacy of the seal.
3345 has partially provided that which the
Model Act has sought to accomplish. However,
the Missouri provision falls short in two respects.
First, as to the character of the promise, it pro-
vides only for promises to pay money or prop-
erty. Secondly, in the conclusiveness of the obliga-
tion, consideration is merely presumed in § 3345,
whereas consideration is unnecessary under the
Model Act if the other requisites are complied
with.
ROBERT J. VIRDEN
ARREST AND DETENTION PRIOR TO EXTRADrIoN-MIssouRI PROCEDURES
AND TH E UNIFORM ACT
The Federal Constitution, adopting substantially the language of the earlier
Articles of Confederation between the thirteen colonies, provides in Article IV,
Sec. 2, that:
"A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other. Crime,
who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand
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of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered
up to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime."'
Notwithstanding the clarity of this provision the Federal Congress, acting on an
opinion of Attorney-General Randolph, decided in 1793 that the section of the
Constitution was not self-executing because it provided no machinery for its execu-
tion, and passed an act for that purpose which has been brought forward to date.2
The above section of the Constitution and the federal act form the basis of the
interstate extradition 3 of fugitive criminals in all the states. The Constitution creates
the right to demand the fugitives, and the federal law creates the machinery and
they thus distinguish interstate extradition from international extradition which
rests entirely upon treaties and is defined by treaty limitations. In Ex parte Roberts,4
it was said that interstate rendition is a proceeding resting on federal and not on
state law, and the authority, power, and duty of the state in such matters is pre-
scribed by Federal Constitution and statutes.
But the act of Congress did not create machinery to cover all the exigencies
which arise; and as the federal law of 1793 has been enlarged by Congress only to
a very limited extent, it has come to be recognized that the several states may
provide machinery for applying the law of extradition in respect to matters not
covered by the act of Congress. However, the federal law, and not the state law,
is supreme, and any state legislation which conflicts with the federal law on the
subject, as embodied in the constitution and effectuating statutes, is unconstitutional
and void. But, to the extent that it aids the operation of federal constitutional and
statutory provisions, and is not inconsistent therewith, state legislation is proper,
and must be followed.5
Thus, the various states have the power to legislate upon the method of arrest
1. U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
2. U. S. Code Cong. Service, Tit. 18, § 3182, p. A508 (1948), effective Sep-
tember 1, 1948, repealing 18 U.S.C. § 662 (1946). "Whenever the executive authority
of any State or. Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the
executive authority of any State, District or Territory to which such person has fled,
and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate
of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed
treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief
magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, the
executive authority of the State, District or Territory to which such person has fled
shall cause him to be arrested and secured, and notify the executive authority mak-
ing such demand, or the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and
shall cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no
such agent appears within thirty days from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may
be discharged." The new law omitted the words "it shall be the duty of" in regard
to the executive authority of the asylum state. It further changed the time the
fugitive could be held from six months to thirty days.
3. In 35 C.J.S. Extradition § 1, p. 318, extradition is defined as, "... the sur-
render by one state or nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of an
offense outside its own territory and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other,
which, being competent to try and punish him, demands the surrender."
4. 186 Wash. 13, 56 P. 2d'703 (1936).
5. 35 C.J.S. Extradition § 3, p. 319.
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and detention of a fugitive from justice before extradition is demanded by the
executive of the state where a crime was committed. This point has been the
subject of quite diversified legislation and judicial decisions in the various states, and
the body of law thus built up is quite different throughout America.
The present Missouri statute is an example of the inadequacy of state legis-
lation supplementing the United States Constitution and federal law upon this
point. This statute is practically identical with Rule 29.62 of the proposed Rules
of Criminal Procedure for the Courts in Missouri7 and is substantially the same
as the one it superseded.8 It provides that:
"Whenever any person within this state shall be charged, on the oath
or affirmation of any credible witness, before any judge or magistrate of
a court of record, except judge of the probate court, with the commission
of any crime in any other state or territory of the United States, and that
he fled from justice, it shall be lawful for the judge or magistrate to issue
his warrant for the apprehension of the party charged."
It would seem that the Missouri statute was enacted to enable Missouri au-
thorities to apprehend a fugitive from justice from another state before extradition
was demanded by the executive of that state. In State v. Swope1 ° the supreme
court said that in order for the magistrate to acquire jurisdiction under the statute
three things are absolutely essential; first, that there is a person within this state;
second, that a credible witness before such magistrate, on oath or affirmation,
charge such person with the commission of a crime in another state; and third,
that such person fled from justice.1
6. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3985 (Supp. 1948), effective January 1, 1947.
7. Rules of Criminal Procedure for Courts of Missouri for adoption by the
Supreme Court of Missouri, Rule 29.62 (June 30, 1948). "When arrest warrant
to issue. Whenever any person within this State shall be charged by complaint made
on the oath or affirmation of a credible witness before any judge or justice of a court
of record or a magistrate, with the commission of a crime in another state or territory
of the United States, and that he fled from justice, such judge, justice or magistrate
may issue his warrant for the arrest of the person so charged, to be brought before
him for examination."
8. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3985, p. 281 (1939). "Whenever any person within
this state shall be charged, on the oath or affirmation of any credible witness, before
any judge or justice of a court of record, or a justice of the peace, with the commis-
sion of any crime in any other state or territory of the United States, and that he
fled from justice, it shall be lawful for the judge or justice to issue his warrant for
the apprehension of the party charged."
9. Supra note 6.
10. 72 Mo. 399 (1880), decided under Mo. REv. STAT. § 5706 (1879) which
is identical with Mo. REv. STAT. § 3985 (1939). One Lewis was arrested and brought
before a justice of the peace on a charge of being fugitive from justice from the state
of Iowa. His hearing was postponed and he gave recognizance, with defendant,
Swope as security. He subsequently made default, and the recognizance was de-
clared forfeited. A scire facias was issued against defendant and he appeared and
demurred. The demurrer was overruled, and final judgment was entered against
him. On appeal to the supreme court the judgment was reversed.
11. Accord: State ex rel. Kaiser v. Miller, 316 Mo. 372, 289 S.W. 898 (1926),
decided under Mo. REv. STAT. § 3939 (1919) which is identical with Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 3985 (1939).
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As a result of this case a county prosecuting attorney or sheriff cannot secure
a warrant for the arrest of a fugitive unless there is a competent witness in this
state to charge on oath or affirmation the commission of a crime. By requiring this
competent witness the legislature has practically nullified the effectiveness of the
statute, since the very nature of the fugitive's presence in this state negatives the
presence of a competent witness who can sign a complaint leading to the issuance
of this fugitive warrant. It is only in the very exceptional case that such a witness
will be available so as to enable Missouri law enforcement officers to comply with
the statute. For this reason, the statute has failed to facilitate the process of arrest
and detention, and Missouri authorities are powerless to apprehend and hold such
fugitives in a large number of cases. This becomes increasingly important in this
day of rapid transportation, where a crime can be committed in any of the other
forty-seven states and a few hours later the criminal be walking the streets of some
small town in Missouri, and necessitates that a change be made in the present Mis-
souri statute to facilitate arrest and detention before extradition is demanded. Al-
though a fugitive could be arrested without a warrant, under a Missouri statute,
to be discussed later, he must be discharged within twenty hours unless he is charged
by some credible person with a criminal offense.
Independent of any state statute, a majority of cases sustain the proposition
that a person charged with a felony or other crime in one state, fleeing to another,
may, before demand is made on the governor of the latter state by the governor of
the former, be arrested in the state in which he is found and detained in custody
a reasonable time in order to give the executive of the state whence he has fled
an opportunity to issue a requisition for his extradition. The arrest may be made
either by virtue of a warrant from a magistrate, or by an officer or private person
without warrant, who may justify the arrest by showing that prima facie a felony
or other crime has been committed by the prisoner in another state, or that he
stands charged therewith. These decisions rest on the principle that a fugitive from
justice in one state may, under the Federal Constitution, be arrested and detained
in the state in which he is found before requisition is actually made by the execu-
tive of the state where the crime was committed.,?
Thus, it would seem that the Missouri statute would not be necessary to enable
authorities to apprehend a fugitive from justice before extradition was demanded,
and that the present dilemma is caused not by any attempt to comply with the
Federal Constitution and statutes but by the particular construction of the Missouri
statute, requiring the presence of a credible witness, coupled with the statute limit-
ing arrest and detention without warrant.
One of the most apparent needs in modernizing the administration of criminal
justice is that of facilitating the arrest and detention of fugitives from justice before
extradition is demanded, so that one state may not become, unintentionally, a sanc-
tuary for criminals who are engaged in the commission of crimes in neighboring
states. The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act' 3 presents a solution for this problem.
12. 22 AM. JUR., Extradition § 11, p. 251.
13. 9 U.L.A. 186.
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In reference to the problem raised by the Missouri statute 4 the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act, which has now been enacted in thirty-four states and Hawaii,"5
provides for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of a fugitive from justice prior
to the time the requisition is received not only when the charge is made upon oath
of a credible person but also when complaint is made upon the affidavit of any
credible person in another state that a crime has been committed in that state.10
The act further provides for the arrest by either an officer or a private citizen with-
out warrant, if the fugitive is charged with a crime punishable by death or im-
prisonment for a term exceeding one year.17 Thus, a fugitive may be arrested with-
out warrant and held until a warrant is issued on a complaint based upon the
14. Supra note 6.
15. 9 U.L.A. 30 (Supp. 1948). The following jurisdictions have adopted the
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Dela-
ware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mex-
ico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming
and Hawaii.
16. Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, § 13, 9 U.L.A. 186. "Arrest Prior to
Requisition.--Whenever any person within this state shall be charged on the oath
of any credible person before any judge or magistrate of this state with the commis-
sion of any crime in any other state and, except in cases arising under Section 6,
with having fled from justice, or with having been convicted of a crime in that
state and having escaped from confinement, or having broken the terms of his bail,
probation or parole, or whenever complaint shall have been made before any judge or
magistrate in this state setting forth on the affidavit of any credible person in another
state that a crime has been committed in such other state and that the accused has
been charged in such state with the commission of the crime, and, except in cases
arising under Section 6, has fled from justice, or. with having been convicted of a
crime in that state and having escaped from confinement, or having broken the terms
of his bail, probation or parole and is believed to be in this state, the judge or
magistrate shall issue a warrant directed to any peace officer. commanding him to
apprehend the person named therein, wherever he may be found in this state, and to
bring him before the same or any other judge, magistrate or court who or which may
be available in or convenient of access to the place where the arrest may be made,
to answer the charge or complaint and affidavit, and a certified copy of the sworn
charge or complaint and affidavit upon which the warrant is issued shall be attached
to the warrant." (Italics added.) Under Section 13 it was held in In re Mitchell,
205 N. C. 788, 172 S.E. 350 (1934) that a prisoner was entitled to a hearing before
the judge issuing the warrant of arrest, before he could be committed to await the
issuance of an extradition warrant by the Governor, and that the warrant under
which prisoner was arrested prior to requisition was regular and valid in all respects.
17. Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, § 14, 9 U.L.A. 188. "Arrest Without a
Warrant.-The arrest of a person may be lawfully made also by any peace officer or
a private person, without a warrant upon reasonable information that the accused
stands charged in the courts of a state with a crime punishable by death or imprison-
ment for a term exceeding one year, but when so arrested the accused must be
taken before a judge or magistrate with all practicable speed and complaint must be
made against him under oath setting forth the ground for the arrest as in the
preceding section; and thereafter his answer shall be heard as if he had been arrested
on warrant." In Picking v. Pennsylvania R. R., 151 F. 2d 240 (C.C.A. 3d 1945), it
was held under Section 14 that the arrest of a fugitive from justice not charged with
a crime for which he might be imprisoned for more than a year on a detainer tele-
gram is a violation of the statute.
[Vol. 15
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affidavit of a person in the state where the crime was committed. The ability of
officers to arrest and detain the fugitive from justice without warrant would, in most
situations, provide sufficient time for an affidavit to arrive from authorities of another
state, so that a warrant may be issued further detaining such fugitive until extradi-
tion is demanded. This type of statutory provision avoids the problem raised by
the inadequate Missouri statute, which requires the presence of a competent witness
and would seem to provide a more than adequate method of arrest and detention
before extradition is demanded.
The problem is further complicated in Missouri, however, by a statute which
provides that all persons confined in jail without warrant shall be discharged within
twenty hours unless they shall be charged with a criminal offense by the oath of
some credible person and held by warrant to answer such charge.18 This statute
would conflict with any statute Missouri might enact to permit authorities to arrest
fugitives where there is no credible witness present in this state to charge the commis-
sion of a crime. So, the mere enactment by the Missouri legislature of a statute of
the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act type would not necessarily remove the present
dilemma unless such statute were made a specific exception to the "twenty hour
rule." If such a statute were not made a specific exception a problem would arise as
to whether it was an automatic exception to the "twenty hour rule."
The enactment of the Uniform Extradition Law and a modification of the
"twenty hour rule" permitting a fugitive to be arrested on a complaint containing an
affidavit of a credible witness in another state would seem to cure the defects of the
present Missouri statute. It then would be no longer necessary for the credible
witness to be present in the state of Missouri to enable authorities to issue a warrant
for the fugitive's arrest.' 9 This would aid in the speedy apprehension of criminals
18. Mo. REv. STAT. § 4346 (1939). "All persons arrested and confined in anyjail, calaboose or other place of confinement by any peace officer, without warrant or
other process, for any alleged breach of the peace or other criminal offense, or on
suspicion thereof, shall be discharged from said custody within twenty hours from
the time of such arrest, unless they shall be charged with a criminal offense by the
oath of some credible person, and be held by warrant to answer to such offense; and
every such person shall, while so confined, be permitted at all reasonable hours during
the day to consult with counsel or other persons in his behalf; and any person or
officer who shall violate the provisions of this section, ...by refusing to permit
him to see and consult with counsel or other persons, or who shall transfer any such
prisoner.., to another place, or prefer against such person a false charge, with intent
to avoid the provisions of this section, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor."
19. Note, 10 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 272, 277 (1936): "The Uniform Extradition
Act provides for an arrest before requisition where a person in this state swears to,
or a complaint on the affidavit of a person in another state sets forth, the necessary
elements for extradition. And an arrest may be made by an officer or private person
without a warrant upon reasonable information that the accused stands charged in
the courts of another state for a crime punishable by a prison term exceeding one
year." Legis., 5 FoRD. L. REv. 484, 488 (1936): "A person charged with a crime
in another state may be arrested prior to a requisition. A warrant for his arrest
may be issued on the strength of an oath or affidavit of any credible person to the
effect that he has committed a crime in another state, and has fled from justice, or
that he has been convicted of a crime in another state and has escaped from
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who cross state boundaries after committing a crime, yet would give adequate pro-
tection to the constitutional rights of the person apprehended, since reasonable in-
formation that a crime has been committed in another state, that the accused has
been charged in that state with that crime, and that he has fled from justice and is
within the state where the arrest is made are all necessary before such arrest may
be made and the warrant issued.
The value of the Uniform Act to Missouri and other states as an instrumentality
of law enforcement will be enhanced to the extent that it is universally adopted and
uniformly interpreted. As to the former, there has been substantial progress. Mis-
souri should not hinder speedy apprehension of criminals and should provide statutory
regulations that will facilitate the arrest and detention of fugitives from justice before
extradition is demanded by the governors of sister states.
R. DWIGHT CRADER
confinement, or has broken the terms of his probation, bail, or parole. Such a person
may also be arrested ...upon reasonable information that he has been charged
with having committed a felony in another state. The prisoner may be held for a
limited period pending formal requisition."
[Vol. is
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